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Sommario
In questa tesi viene effettuata un’analisi teorica destinata allo sviluppo di algoritmi distribuiti
(decentralizzati) per il controllo di potenza per reti wireless che utilizzano la tecnologia
ultrawideband (UWB), in condizioni di canale trasmissivo selettivo in frequenza e con fading
lentamente variabile, concentrandosi sulla fase iniziale di sincronizzazione dei codici. Il
modello teorico qui sviluppato e` sufficientemente generico da poter essere applicato anche
alle reti che fanno uso dell’accesso multiplo a suddivisione di codice (Code Division Multi-
ple Access, CDMA), visto come caso particolare dell’ UWB. Per sviluppare questo lavoro,
viene fatto ricorso alla teoria dei giochi, la quale si rivela particolarmente utile per derivare
tecniche di controllo di potenza che siano distribuite, scalabili ed efficienti dal punto di vista
energetico, e pertanto particolarmente indicate per terminali mobili operanti in uno scenario
multipath. Il problema del controllo di potenza e` modellato come un gioco noncooperativo,
nel quale ciascuna coppia trasmettitore-ricevitore decide gli opportuni livello di potenza in
trasmissione e soglia di rivelazione in ricezione in modo da massimizzare la sua utilita`, definita
come il rapporto tra probabilita` di corretta rivelazione ed energia trasmessa nel periodo di
acquisizione (o per bit).

Abstract
This thesis describes a theoretical framework for the design and the analysis of distributed
(decentralized) power control algorithms for wireless networks using ultrawideband (UWB)
technologies over a frequency-selective and slow-fading channel, focusing of the issue of initial
code synchronization. The framework described here is general enough to also encompass
the analysis of Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) systems, seen as a special case of
the Impulse-Radio (IR)-UWB technology. To develop this work, we use the tools of game
theory that are expedient for deriving scalable, energy-efficient, distributed power control
schemes to be applied to a population of battery-operated user terminals in a rich multipath
environment. The power control issue is modeled as a noncooperative game in which each
transmitter-receiver pair chooses its transmit power and detection threshold pair so as to
maximize its own utility, which is defined as the ratio of the probability of signal detection
to the transmitted energy per acquisition period (or per bit).
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Introduction
Motivations
A Radio Resource Management (RRM) framework is required for a wireless network to
achieve the desired network objective (applications/services requirement) under the con-
straint on available radio resource (e.g., the radio spectrum in terms of frequency band or
time slot, or transmission power). RRM importance in network design has become greater
and greater as the demand for ubiquitous broadband wireless sevices has increased. RRM is
the set of functionalities whose aim is to provide services according to the Quality of Service
(QoS) negotiated for each application over the area covered by the system and to optimize
the system capacity through the choice of the best resource sharing among users. Power
control, together with some other well-known functionalities such as scheduling, admission
control, congestion and load control, handover and link adaptation, belongs to RRM.
With the advent of the third-Generation (3G) cellular networks, high-speed data services
have become available to the mobile population and the imposing success of wireless data
applications in the last few years has produced an ever-increasing demand for reliable high-
speed data services. These market drivers have generated a number of new technologies
that provide multiple access capability and possibly interference mitigation. UWB commu-
nication has emerged as a possible solution for next-generation short-range high-speed data
transmission, due to its large spreading factor (which implies large multiuser capacity) and
low power spectral density (which allows coexistence with incumbent systems in the same
frequency bands). The main difference with respect to conventional narrowband or wideband
networks is represented by the frequency selectivity of the wireless channel, which is due to
the extremely high temporal resolution of the transmitted signals. This motivates us to study
the effect of such frequency selectivity when applying power control schemes to UWB-based
networks.
In an UWB system, power control is very important not only to achieve the highest
transmission rate but also to limit the interference to other users. In a multiuser wireless
network, all users share the same transmission bandwidth. In an uplink transmission scenario,
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every user has its own Signal-plus-Interference Noise Ratio (SINR), depending on its transmit
power, the channel gain, the intra-channel interference, the co-channel interference and the
unfailing noise power.
Interferences, which are due to the shared nature of the wireless medium and to its frequency
selectivity, represents a major impairment to the performance of wireless communications. In
addition to data detection, every uplink receiver in the Base Station (BS) of a UWB network
must perform the fundamental function of initial signal synchronization to lock onto the
terminal’s signature code. Furthermore, because of the presence of battery-powered mobile
terminals in the network, careful management of the energy consumption is needed. The
idea of this work is to apply the optimum decentralized power allocation devised for data
detection also to a Resource Allocation (RA) strategy that is good for such synchronization
function.
The objective of power control is to maximize some system performance (e.g., the sum of
the throughput of all users). An optimization problem can be formulated to obtain optimal
transmit powers for all users. However, this solution is viable only when the BS or the
central controller can control the transmit power of all users and the users obey to do so. In
contrast, if the users are indipendent and rational to maximize their individual throughputs,
a noncooperative game can be formulated to obtain an equilibrium solution for the transmit
power allocation problem. This equilibrium solution ensures that none of the users will
unilaterally deviate from it. Our noncooperative game is a game wherein the users are
allowed to choose their transmit powers according to a utility-maximization criterion, where
the utility is defined as the ratio of the probability of signal detection to the transmitted
energy per acquisition.
Recently, game theory has been used as an effective tool to study distributed power control
in data networks. An important feature of the game-theoretic approach is the inherent
decentralization of the algorithms for power control, which allows each user to individually
choose its own transmit power through a simple noncooperative scheme. Distributed (nonco-
operative) solutions are in general suboptimal with respect to those obtained via a centralized
(cooperative) approach, but they are particularly well suited to a largely populated network
due to their intrinsic scalability. The centralized approach is often characterized by NP-hard
(Non-deterministic Polynomial-time hard) problems, whose solutions cannot be reasonably
computed (or even approximated) in real-time.
The prominent characteristic of the game-theoretic approach, which justifies its widespread
range of applications, is its capability of distributing decision-making processes among ratio-
nal users, once benefits and drawbacks of the actions they are allowed to choose are quantified.
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Even though game theory was originally developed to predict the outcome of interactions
among economic agents, it is apparent that this framework also fits the situation of resource
competition in wireless networks.
The core of this work is about an energy efficient power resource allocation to optimize the
receiver performance in terms of spreading code acquisition. The problem of initial signal
acquisition is formulated as a noncooperative game in which each transmitter-receiver pair in
the network seeks to maximize the above-mentioned utility function and in which the game
each receiver plays consists in setting its own transmit power and detection threshold, under
a constraint on the maximum probability of spurious code locks. This formulation of the
game captures the tradeoff between obtaining good code acquisition performance and saving
as much energy as possible.
In this thesis, we will address the problem of game-theoretic power control, focusing of the
issue of initial code synchronization, for wideband wireless communication systems operating
in a frequency selective scenario, which include both UWB-based and CDMA-based networks.
Outline
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows.
In Chapter 1, we present the issues to base our work. In the first part, we briefly describe
the UWB and CDMA technologies, whilst, in the second part, we introduce the fundamental
tools of game theory, paying particular attention on the basics of static noncooperative games.
After the description of other key concepts as Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality,
we provide the near-far effect game example as a motivating one for the application of
noncooperative game theory to power control problems.
In Chapter 2, we describe the system considered throughout the thesis. At first, we define
the transmitter signals format, then the analytical model of the frequency-selective wireless
channel is presented; after that, we develop a detailed description of the Rake receiver and
the subsequent behaviour of the relevant quantities of the system from the IN to the OUT
leading to an explicit expression of the SINR of a generic user to found the remainder of the
work. This chapter ends with the false alarm and detection probabilities definitions.
Chapter 3 is the core of this thesis. Here we formulate the noncooperative game with
complete information and then we study the existence and the uniqueness of the Generalized
Nash Equilibrium (GNE) of the proposed game.
In Chapter 4, we propose an iterative algorithm to reach the Nash solution in a distributed
fashion and then we provide some numerical results to validate the theoretical analysis.
4 Introduction
Finally, in Chapter 5, we draw some conclusions for this thesis.
Chapter 1
Background
1.1 Multiple access wireless communication systems
1.1.1 UWB
The increasing demand for reliable high-speed data services in wireless networks has generated
a number of new technologies that provide multiple access capability with efficient resource
allocation and possibly interference mitigation. UWB communication has emerged as a possi-
ble solution to satisfy these market drivers. As its name suggests, this technique makes use of
extremely wide radio-frequency bandwidths to offer a wealth of attractive features for wireless
communications, as well as for networking, radar, imaging and positioning systems [1–4].
UWB has a history as old as wireless itself, as the pioneering work on wireless telegraphy of
Guglielmo Marconi made use of spark-gap transmission devices [1, 5]. The first applications
of “modern” UWB technology dates back to the late 1960s [6], when UWB radars were intro-
duced in military applications, whilst UWB for commercial wireless communications gained
prominence with the groundbreaking work on Impulse Radio (IR) by Win and Scholtz in the
1990s [7–9]. The final clearance of UWB technology for commercial applications was ratified
with the first rulemaking proposal in 2002, when the United States (US) frequency regulator,
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), allowed unlicensed UWB operation [10].
Currently, similar regulatory processes are under way in many other countries worldwide. In
Europe, the Electronic Communications Committee (ECC) TG3 officially authorized the use
of UWB technology in 2007 [11]. At present, UWB is spreading in the world of information
technologies in two competing de-facto standards, either for Wireless Personal Area Networks
(WPANs), or for high-speed connection of computer peripherals to main units – the so-called
wireless Universal Serial Bus (W-USB).
UWB systems include all bandpass transmitting schemes with either large relative band-
width (typically, larger than 20%), and all baseband systems with large absolute bandwidth
(typically, larger than 500 MHz). To allow unlicensed operation over such wide ranges,
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radiation emissions must respect strict frequency regulations not to affect the performance of
incumbent (possibly licensed) systems. Those spectral masks depend on the application and
on the environment in which the devices operate.
The physical layer of IR-UWB systems is based on the transmission of low-power ultra-short
information-bearing pulses (commonly referred to asmonocycles). This approach brings forth
a number of distinctive features such as:
i) significant multiuser capability, due to the large bandwidth spreading factor;
ii) potential for extremely high data rates, thanks to the wide transmission bandwidth;
iii) enhanced capability to penetrate through obstacles, due to the concurrent presence of
energy over a wide range of different frequencies;
iv) coexistence with incumbent systems in the same frequency bands, because of its low
power spectral density; and
v) potential for small-size and low-powered mobile terminals, due to the small processing
power required.
The list above represents the main motivations that led to the development of UWB
technology as an access scheme for innovative high-speed data networks [5,12–14]. However,
the appealing features of UWB technology are not enough per se to comply with the current
ever-increasing demand for larger network capacity. In the near future, wireless networks are
expected to support a variety of applications with different QoS constraints. In addition,
efficient RA at the transmitter side is mandatory in any instances, due to the presence of
mobile, battery-powered terminals. The goal of the system designer is thus to design wireless
networks that use the available resources (namely, bandwidth and energy) as efficiently as
possible, while satisfying the QoS requirements of the users. Although a layered approach
based on the OSI model is very successful for designing wired systems [15], this has proven to
be quite inefficient for wireless networks [16]. In wireless networks, because of fading channels,
user mobility, energy/power resources, and many other factors, one cannot optimize wireless
communication systems as has been traditionally done in wired networks, in which one can
simply focus on and optimize each networking layer without paying much attention to the
effects of other layers. For wireless networks, cross-layer optimization is a central issue to
ensure overall system performance. Yet RA is one of the most important issues for cross-
layer optimization of wireless networks. This layered approach inadequacy is especially true
for large, dynamic networks with variable, possibly mobile nodes, whose control must be as
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adaptive and scalable as possible. The natural consequence is that the network design must
follow a cross-layer approach that involves optimization and performance evaluation of both
the physical and the data-link layer.
There exist several technologies to implement UWB. Depending on the spreading codes
employed, these systems are termed Time Hopping (TH)-UWB [7], Direct-Sequence (DS)-
UWB [17], or baseband Single-Carrier/MultiCarrier (SC/MC)-UWB [18,19], just to mention
a few.
1.1.2 CDMA
Direct-Sequence Code Division Multiple Access (DS/CDMA) is a multiple access technique
in which spectral spreading is accomplished by direct multiplication in the time domain of the
information bearing bits (or symbols). Spread-spectrum (SS) refers to any modulated signal
whose bandwidth around the carrier frequency is much larger than its information bit rate. In
SS signaling, the bandwidth occupancy of the transmitted signal is intentionally increased well
beyond the value required for conventional narrowband transmission, whereas the transmitted
power being the same. This is done to enhance signal robustness against interference and
distortions caused by frequency-selective radio channels. Spectrum spreading also reduces
the level of radiated power density and allows the simultaneous utilization of the same (wide)
bandwidth by multiple users (multiple access). Direct sequence is one possible way to realize
spectrum spreading. The information-bearing symbols, running at rate Rs = 1/Ts, are
multiplied in time domain by a sequence made of binary symbols (called chips) ck running at
the much higher rate Rc = 1/Tc ≫ Rs, with Tc the chip interval. The result of this product
(which is carried out before transmit pulse shaping takes place) is a stream of ”chipped”
high-rate symbols running at the chip rate Rc. The resulting signal to be transmitted turns
out to have a bandwidth occupancy wider than that of conventional modulation schemes,
and in particular, comparable to the chip rate. The binary sequence ck is usually periodic
with period L chips and is referred to as spreading sequence or spreading code. Assuming
that one symbol interval Ts spans an integer number M of chip intervals Tc of the spreading
code, the ratio between the bandwidth occupancy of SS signal and the bandwidth of the
corresponding narrowband modulated signal is defined as M = Ts/Tc = Rc/Rs itself. M
is called the spreading factor. The spreading code can be a short code, when one data
symbol interval exactly spans a (small) integer number of the spreading sequence repetition
periods (e.g., M = L) or a long code, when its repetition period is much longer than the
data symbol duration (M ≪ L). At the receiver side, to reveal the information symbols,
a despreading operation is needed. Multiplying the arrived signal by the same spreading
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Spreading code
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Despreaded signal
integration
Figure 1.1: Optimal DS-CDMA spreading-despreading operation example
code used at the transmitter side, the spreading is avoided and the information-bearing
signal is the remaining result. This is possible because the chips belong to the alphabet
{-1,+1}. This spread/despread procedure is shown in Fig. 1.1, where we can see that
s(t)c(t)c(t) = s(t). Obviously, the knowledge of the spreading code to use for despreading
is fundamental: multiplying the received signal by a wrong spreading code carries out a
nonsense sequence.
After despreading, an integration operation to obtain desired bits, such as 1M
∫ Tb
0 s(t)dt,
is needed. In an optimal scenario, the right alternation of information bits is carried out
(as demonstrated by the marks every Tb), otherwise a wrong despreading leads to an in-
tegration result nearly equal to zero. If the spreading codes are orthogonals, we obtain∫ Tb
0 s(t)c(t)c
′(t)dt = 0 exactly, where c′(t) 6= c(t), as displayed in Fig. 1.2. Othogonality
means that the cross-correlation between two sequences is equal to zero, i.e., 1Tb
∫ Tb
0 c(t)c
′(t)dt =
0. To know the right despreading code is not sufficient to obtain the correct data detection
nevertheless: synchronization is necessary. The spreading codes must be time-aligned at the
receiver side. The propagation channel introduces a delay that must therefore estimated and
tracked to ensure such an alignment. Fig. 1.3 shows a simple example in which there is
no synchrony: the despreaded signal seems closer to a random signal than to the original
data one, furthermore the loss of orthogonality between spreading code leads to samples
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Figure 1.2: Wrong spreading code despreading example
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Figure 1.3: Out-of-synchrony spreading code despreading example
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not equal to zero as the one circled at the bottom of the figure. The main difference with
respect to narrowband modulations is the estimatory accurancy. In narrowband systems,
timing errors must be small compared to the symbol time (Ts), whereas in spread-spectrum
systems, they must be small compared with the chip time (Tc), which is M times smaller.
Hence, synchronization is one of the most important practical problems of a CDMA system.
Mathematically speaking, synchronization is an estimation problem in which we determine
the optimum sampling time out of an infinetely large ensemble of possible values (i.e., the
continuos time). Implementation is facilitated by splitting the problem into two partial
problems:
i) Acquisition: a first step determines in which time interval (Tc or Tc/2) the optimum
sampling time lies. This is a hypothesis-testing problem: we test a finite number of
hypotheses, each of which assumes that the sampling time is in a certain interval. The
hypotheses can be tested in parallel or serially.
ii) Tracking : as soon as this interval has been determined, a control loop can be used for
fine-tuning the sampling time to its exact value.
For the acquisition phase, it could be used a special synchronization sequence that is shorter
than the spreading sequence used during data transmission. This decreases the number
of hypotheses that have to be tested, and thus decreases the time that has to be spent on
synchronization. In the remainder, we use synchronization sequences as long as the spreading
sequences nevertheless. Furthermore, the synchronization sequence can be designed to have
especially good autocorrelation properties. For the tracking part, the normal spreading
sequence used for data communications can be employed. In a centralized scenario (syn-
chronous), a special kind of orthogonal codes, named Orthogonal Variable Spreading Factor
(OVSF), are utilized. OVSF codes derive from Walsh-Hadamard (WH) codes: the latter
are bit sequences of fixed length, the former are orthogonal bit sequences of variable length.
OVSF codes are necessary to deal with different kinds of services (e.g., voice, data, video)
with their respective bit rates. The OVSF code set is a reorganization of WH codes into
layers. The codes on each layer have twice the length of the codes in the previous layer. Also,
the codes are organized in a tree, wherein any two ”children” codes on the layer underneath
a ”parent” code are generated by repetition and repetition with sign change, respectively,
of the parent. The peculiarity of the tree is that any two codes are orthogonal not only
within each layer (each layer is just the complete set of the WH codes of the corresponding
length), but also across layers, provided that the shorter is not an ”ancestor” of the longer
one. Orthogonality across layers means that the two codes are othogonal both on the length
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of the longer code (after extension by repetition of the shorter code to make it the same
length as the other) and on the length of the shorter code (for all of the longer code sections
having the length of the shorter one). As a consequence, we can use the shorter code for a
higher-rate transmission with a smaller spreading factor, and the longer code for a lower-rate
transmission with a higher spreading factor (recall that the chip rate is always the same).
The two codes will not give rise to any channel cross talk. In a multiple access scenario
(asynchronous), the favourable properties of OVSF codes are not valid anymore. Because of
different propagation delay paths, there is a lack of coordination at the receiver, leading to
a somewhat different approach. Since it is not mathematically possible to create signature
sequences that are both orthogonal for arbitrarily random starting points and which make
full use of the code space, unique pseudo-random or Pseudo-Noise (PN) sequences are used.
Gold codes are an example of PN sequences suitable for this purpose, as there is a low
correlation between the codes. Gold codes are non-orthogonal, so their cross-correlation is
not equal to zero, i.e., Rcc′(0) =
1
T
∫ T
0 c(t)c
′(t)dt 6= 0, where T is the duration time of the
sequences. Look over this cross-correlation function: the interference due to a signal with
a different spreading code c′(t) is very low as demonstrated by |Rcc′(0)| ≪ 1; when a not
perfect alignment occurs, its value, at a delay misalignment τ , is very low too. Hence, we
can write that |Rcc′(τ)| ≪ 1 ∀τ . This means that some misalignment is not so detrimental
for data revealing. Obviously, every user needs its own unique Gold code.
1.2 Game theory to address radio resource management
Game theory is a broad field of applied mathematics aimed at describing and analyzing
interactive decision processes. In particular, it provides the analytical tools to predict the
outcome of complex interactions among rational entities, where rationality calls for strict
adherence to a strategy based on perceived or measured results [20]. Economists have long
used game theory as a framework for examining the actions of economic agents such as firms in
a market. Traditionally, the main areas of application have been economics, political science,
biology, and sociology. Since the early 1990s, engineering and computer science have been
added to the list. Recently, game theory has also been widely used in telecommunications
and wireless communications [21–23].
1.2.1 Static games
In the game-theoretic context, a game can be defined as “a description of strategic interaction
that includes the constraints on the actions that the players take and the players’ interests”
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[20]. In this scenario, the basic entity is represented by the player, who can be thought of
as an individual or as a group of individuals making a decision. If the actions taken by each
player are chosen individually, then the game is referred to as noncooperative. Alternatively,
if the actions of each group of players are chosen jointly, then the game is referred to as
cooperative. Throughout this thesis we will focus on noncooperative games only.
The existence of many possible formulations of a game can easily be argued from the general
definition provided above. The simpler type of a game is represented by the static game, which
follows this form: first, the players simultaneously choose their actions; and then, the players
receive their own payoffs that depend on the combination of actions just chosen by all players
(it does not imply that the parties necessarily act simultaneously but it suffices that each
player chooses his/her own action without knowledge of the others’ choices). Within the
class of such static (or simultaneous-move) games, we restrict attention to games of complete
information. The concept of complete information implies that each player’s payoff function
(the function that determines the player’s payoff from the combination of actions chosen by
all the players) is common knowledge between all the players. Intuitively, games of incomplete
information, also called Bayesian games, are the ones in which a player does not know exactly
what actions other players have done up to his turn and are not considered in this thesis.
Strategic-form representation
A game in strategic (or normal) form consists of three components:
(1) a set of players;
(2) a set of actions (strategies) available to each player;
(3) the payoff received by each player for each combination of strategies that could be chosen
by the players.
In its mathematical formulation, a K-player game can be represented as follows [24]:
Definition 1 The strategic-form representation of a game can be denoted by the notation
G = [K, {Ak} , {uk (a)}], where:
(1) K = {1, . . . ,K} is the finite set of players;
(2) Ak is the set of pure strategies (actions) available to player k; and
(3) uk (a) is the utility (payoff) for player k.
1.2 Game theory to address radio resource management 13
The set of pure strategies Ak (often referred to as player k’s pure-strategy space) represents
the space of all the possible strategies that player k can choose. Based on the nature of the
pure-strategy space, two different types of game can be identified:
• finite games, i.e., games where the joint set of strategy space A = A1 × . . . × AK is
finite, or, equivalently, where the number of actions is countable;
• infinite games, i.e., games where the number of actions is uncountable.
For the ease of presentation, the examples provided in the following involve finite games.
However, the major results of this thesis focus on infinite games.
The strategy chosen by player k can be expressed as ak ∈ Ak. When considering a pure-
strategy space, there exists a deterministic relationship that assigns each player k a certain
strategy ak. The set of strategies chosen by all players in the game constitutes the pure-
strategy profile a = [a1, . . . , aK ].
This approach can be extended by resorting to a mixed strategy ξk ∈ Ξk, where Ξk is the
mixed-strategy space, and ξk is a probability distribution over player k’s pure strategy. In
other words, ξk is a probability distribution that assigns a probability ξk(ak) to each action
ak. Note that the set of mixed (i.e., statistical) strategies contains the pure-strategy space,
as degenerate probability distributions are included. In fact, ak can be simply obtained
when ξk assigns zero probability to all actions but ak. This thesis is primarily focused on
pure-strategy game, as a consequence, mixed strategies are not discussed in the remainder of
this section. However, it should be noted that mixed strategies play a key role in all game-
theoretic aspects, as will be clearly stated in Sect. 1.2.2. For a detailed discussion, please
refer to [20,25].
The utility achieved by each player is a function that measures his/her level of satisfaction.
Clearly, the utility uk (a) achieved by player k depends not only on his/her own strategy
ak, but also on the actual strategies chosen by all the other players, referred to as player k’s
opponents (note that this terminology does not mean that the other players are trying to
“beat” player k, but simply that each player’s objective is to maximize his/her own payoff
function, and this may involve “helping” or “hurting” the other players) and denoted by \k ,
K\{k}. As a consequence, uk (a) depends on the pure-strategy profile a, whose definition can
also be restated as a =
[
ak,a\k
]
, where obviously a\k , [a1, . . . , ak−1, ak+1, . . . , aK ] ∈ A\k.
Hence, player k’s utility is uk (a) = uk
(
ak,a\k
)
(in the case of mixed strategies, player’s k
payoff is a polynomial function of the mixed strategies of all players in the game [25]).
Definition 2 A game with complete information is a game in which each player knows the
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game G = [K, {Ak} , {uk (a)}], notably the set of players K, the set of strategies {Ak} of each
player, and the payoff functions {uk (a)} of each player.
1.2.2 Nash equilibrium
As stated in Sect. 1.2.1, a game describes the constraints on the players’ actions and interests,
but does not specify the actions that the players do take [20]. Once the game is expressed in
its strategic form, it is interesting to solve it. Solving a game means predicting the strategy
each player will choose. To predict the outcome of a static game, it is fundamental to assume
that:
i) the game is of complete information, i.e., all players know the structure of the strategic
form, and know that their opponents know it, and know that their opponents know that
they know, and so on ad infinitum;
ii) all players are rational, i.e., they are aware of their alternatives, form expectations about
any unknowns, have clear preferences, and choose their action deliberately after some
process of optimization.
The rational behaviour reflects in the fact that a rational player will not play a strictly
dominated strategy, defined as follows:
Definition 3 In the strategic-form game G = [K, {Ak} , {uk (a)}], a strategy a′′k is strictly
dominated by strategy a′k if
uk
(
a′′k,a\k
)
< uk
(
a′k,a\k
)
, ∀a\k ∈ A\k. (1.1)
It is straightforward to understand that a rational player does not choose a strictly domi-
nated strategy, since the payoff achieved by playing it is always lower than that provided by
another action irrespective of the opponents’ strategies.
More generally, the solution of a strategic-form game can be found by iteratively eliminating
strictly dominated strategies. Such method goes by the name of iterated strict dominance [24].
Unfortunately, many if not most games of practical interest are not solvable by iterated strict
dominance. In contrast, the concept of a Nash equilibrium solution produces much tighter
predictions in a very broad class of games. This notion captures a steady-state of the play of
a strategic game in which each player holds the correct expectation about the other players’
behaviour and acts rationally (it is worth stating that the concept of Nash equilibrium does
not attempt to examine the process by which a steady state is reached).
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Definition 4 A pure-strategy profile a∗ =
[
a∗k,a
∗
\k
]
is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of
the strategic-form game G = [K, {Ak} , {uk (a)}], if, for all players k ∈ K,
uk
(
a∗k,a
∗
\k
)
≥ uk
(
ak,a
∗
\k
)
, ∀ak ∈ Ak, (1.2)
where a∗\k =
[
a∗1, . . . , a
∗
k−1, a
∗
k+1, . . . , a
∗
K
]
.
The definition of the Nash equilibrium can easily be extended to mixed-strategy profiles [25].
Analogously to pure strategies, pure-strategy Nash equilibria are degenerated mixed-strategy
Nash equilibria.
The Nash equilibrium offers a stronger solution concept than iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies, in the sense that the players’ strategies in a Nash equilibrium always
survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, but the converse is not true [24].
By inspecting Definition 4, it is clear that a Nash equilibrium represents a stable outcome
of the noncooperative game in which multiple agents (players) with (in general) conflicting
interests compete through self-optimization and reach a point where no player has any
incentive to unilaterally deviate. The Nash equilibrium can be seen from another point
of view. In a noncooperative game, the strategy chosen by a rational self-optimizing player
constitutes a best response to the actions chosen by the other players. Formally, player k’s
best-response function rk : A\k → Ak is the correspondence that assigns each opponents’
profile a\k ∈ A\k the set
rk
(
a\k
)
= arg max
ak∈Ak
uk
(
ak,a\k
)
=
{
ak ∈ Ak : uk
(
ak,a\k
) ≥ uk (a′k,a\k) for all a′k ∈ Ak} . (1.3)
With the notion of a player’s best response, the Nash equilibrium can be restated as follows:
Definition 5 The pure-strategy profile a∗ is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game
G = [K, {Ak} , {uk (a)}] if and only if
a∗k ∈ rk
(
a∗\k
)
, for all k ∈ K. (1.4)
Theorem 1 (Nash, [26]) In the strategic-form game G = [K, {Ak} , {uk (a)}], if K is finite
and Ak is finite for every k (i.e., in a finite game), then there exists at least one Nash
equilibrium, possibly involving mixed strategies.
This theorem (its proof can be found in [24, 25]) is of crucial importance in game theory,
since it establishes the existence of (at least) one steady state solution for every finite game.
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In fact, although characterizing the set of equilibria is in general difficult in many interesting
games, this result allows the properties of these equilibria to be studied without funding them
explicitly and without taking the risk that we are studying the empty set.
The existence of at least one (possibly mixed-strategy) Nash equilibrium implies that a
strategic-form finite game may have no pure-strategy equilibria, one pure-strategy equilib-
rium, or multiple pure-strategy equilibria. It is interesting to note that Theorem 1 represents a
special case of the following theorem, which considers infinite games with continuous payoffs:
Theorem 2 (Debreu, [27]; Glicksberg, [28]; Fan, [29]) Consider a game G in strategic
form, in which the pure-strategy spaces Ak are nonempty compact convex subsets of a Eu-
clidean space. If the utility functions uk (a) are continuous in a and quasi-concave
1 in ak,
there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in G.
The proof, similar to that of Theorem 1, can be found in [25].
As can be seen in the following chapters, this result is of particular interest for the scope of
this thesis, since it establishes the existence of (at least) one pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium
in infinite strategic-form games, provided that the hypotheses of Theorem 2 are met.
1.2.3 Pareto optimality
So far, no considerations about the efficiency of the outcome of the game have been done. In
general, there is no guarantee that a Nash equilibrium is a desirable outcome for the players.
Intuitively, this is motivated by the distributed approach between the players, which could
be expected to be less efficient than a possible strategy profile obtained through cooperation
between the players and/or as a result of a centralized optimization.
Two important concepts to investigate the efficiency of the solution(s) of strategic-form
games are the Pareto dominance and the Pareto optimality. A strategy profile is said to
be more efficient (or Pareto-dominant) if it is possible to increase the utility of some of the
players without hurting any other player. A formal definition is as follows:
Definition 6 A strategy profile a˜ Pareto-dominates another vector a if, for all k ∈ K,
uk
(
a˜k, a˜\k
) ≥ uk (ak,a\k), and, for some k ∈ K, uk (a˜k, a˜\k) > uk (ak,a\k).
It is worth noting that the players might need to change their strategies simultaneously to
reach the Pareto-dominant strategy profile a˜. Based on the concept of Pareto dominance, it
is possible to identify the most efficient strategy profile(s):
1A function uk (a) : Ak → R
1
+ defined on the convex set Ak is quasi-concave in ak if and only if
uk
(
λak + (1− λ)a
′
k,a\k
)
≥ min
{
uk
(
ak,a\k
)
, uk
(
a′k,a\k
)}
for all ak, a
′
k ∈ Ak and λ ∈ [0, 1].
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Definition 7 A strategy profile a˜ is Pareto-optimal if there exists no other strategy profile
a such that uk
(
ak,a\k
) ≥ uk (a˜k, a˜\k) for all k ∈ K and uk (ak,a\k) > uk (a˜k, a˜\k) for some
k ∈ K.
In other words, in a Pareto-optimal strategy profile, it is not possible to increase the payoff
of one player without decreasing that of at least one other player. Furthermore, it can be
shown in general that there exists no mixed-strategy profile that Pareto-dominates any pure-
strategy profile, because any mixed strategy of a player k is a linear combination of his/her
own pure strategies with positive coefficients that sum up to 1 [21].
The game can have several Pareto-optimal strategy profiles and the set of these profiles is
called the Pareto frontier. It is important to emphasize that a Pareto-optimal strategy profile
is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, a Pareto-optimal strategy profile does not
necessarily Pareto-dominate all other strategy profiles.
As will be better stated in the remainder of this thesis, the efficiency of the outcome of a
noncooperative game must seriously be taken into account. In fact, although noncooperative
approaches show many appealing features due to their inherent decentralization scheme, a
significant inefficiency of their outcome(s) could make them inapplicable to practical scenar-
ios.
1.2.4 Game theory in wireless networks
As stated before, game theory has been profitably applied to wireless networks since the mid-
1990s. To exploit the analytical tools of game theory, the abstract concepts introduced in
the previous sections should be properly adapted to wireless networks. This section contains
some toy examples that are expedient to understand how a simplified power control problem
can be modeled as a noncooperative game [30]. For a brief overview of current research in
the field of power control for wireless networks based on the noncooperative game-theoretic
framework, the interested readers can refer to [16].
To illustrate the intuitive meaning of these concepts, we consider a trivial example of a
static noncooperative game, called the near-far effect game. Two wireless terminals (player
1 and player 2) transmit to a certain access point (AP) in a CDMA network. Player 1 is
located close to the AP, whilst player 2 is much farther away, as is depicted in Fig. 1.4.
Hence, K = 2 and K = {1, 2}. Each user is allowed either to transmit at a certain power
level pk = p, or to wait (pk = 0). This translates into Ak = Pk = {0, p}. Each terminal
achieves a degree of satisfaction which depends on the outcome of the transmission and on
the cost due to the energy spent for transmitting at power pk. Mathematically, this translates
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Player 1
Player 2
AP
Figure 1.4: The network scenario in the near-far effect game.
into an adimensional utility uk (a) = uk (p1, p2) = tk − zk, where tk = 1 if the transmission
is successful and tk = 0 otherwise; also, the cost is zk = z ≪ 1 if the player chooses to
transmit, and zk = 0 otherwise. Due to the near-far effect, sketched in Fig. 1.4, whenever
the near player (player 1) chooses to transmit, his/her transmission is successful irrespective
of the action of the far player (player 2). In particular, if p1 = p, player 1 can deliver his/her
information, thus receiving a utility u1 (p, p2) = 1− z (irrespective of p2). If p1 = 0 (player 1
is idle), his/her utility is u1 (0, p2) = 0 (irrespective of p2 again). Let us now focus on player
2. Because of the interference caused by player 1, player 2 transmits successfully only when
player 1 is idle (p1 = 0). In this case, u2 (0, p) = 1 − z. If both players play pk = p, due
to the near-far effect, player 2’s transmission fails and u2 (p, p) = −z. Similarly to player 1,
u2 (p1, 0) = 0 when player 2 is idle.
The near-far effect game is summarized in the strategic-form matrix depicted in Fig. 1.5.
By inspecting the payoff matrix, it is apparent that player 1’s best strategy is represented
by p1 = p whatever p2 is, since 1 − z > 0 under the assumption z ≪ 1. This is known to
player 2 as well. Hence, to “limit damage”, he/she rationally chooses to play p2 = 0. As a
conclusion, the near-far effect game has only one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, represented
by the strategy a = (p, 0) (the same conclusion follows from Definition 4).
By applying Definition 7, this game can be shown to have two Pareto-optimal solutions,
namely (p, 0) and (0, p). Hence, the (only) pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is also Pareto-
optimal. However, our solution (p, 0) is highly unsatisfactory for player 2 since he/she does
not show to convey any information to the AP. We take this apparent need for fairness as
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Figure 1.5: Payoff matrix for the near-far effect game.
our motivation to introduce power control.
Let us provide our near-far effect game with a naive form of power control. Assume now that
each terminal is allowed to transmit choosing between two different levels of transmit power:
either a certain amount p, or a reduced level ηp, where η, 0 < η < 1. The power control
factor η is such that the received power for both players is the same when the far player uses
p and the near player uses ηp. Hence, Ak = Pk = {ηp, p}. Similarly to the previous game
with no power control, uk (p1, p2) = tk − zk, where tk = 1 if the transmission for player k is
successful, and tk = 0 otherwise, and where zk is proportional to the consumed energy, i.e.,
zk = z if pk = p, and zk = ηz if pk = ηp. As before, due to the near-far effect, player 1 can
successfully transmit irrespective of p2, whereas player 2 can correctly reach the receiver only
if p2 > p1. The payoff matrix for this game is shown in Fig. 1.6. Since 1− ηz > 1− z, player
1’s best strategy is p1 = ηp. Consequently, player 2 plays p2 = p. This game has thus one
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, which is also the only Pareto-optimal solution.
This power control technique seems to compensate for the near-far effect, since both players
are now able to transmit. However, this scenario does not actually model real data networks.
The main inaccuracy lies in the over-simplified utility function. Our “go/no-go” utility
is suitable only for those applications for which the acceptable quality of a connection is
specified by a maximum tolerable bit error rate (BER), which turns into a minimum signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) requirement. This is the typical case for voice networks,
in which the voice user is usually indifferent to small changes in its SINR [31]. In a data
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Figure 1.6: Payoff matrix for the near-far effect game with power control and zero-one utility.
network, higher SINRs lead to a larger amount of transmitted information. This implies
that the utility for a data terminal is a continuous function of its SINR. To account for this
different point of view, the term tk should be a function of the amount of information that is
actually delivered to the receiver. Focusing on player 1, if p1 = p, the (normalized) amount
of information (we may call it the throughput) is equal to t1 = t ≫ z. If player 1 uses a lower
power p1 = ηp, then t1 = λt, with η < λ . 1.2 Considering player 2, t2 = 0 if p2 ≤ p1, and
t2 = λt if p2 > p1, since the received power for player 2 is equal to that of player 1 with
p1 = ηp.
The payoff matrix for this game is shown in Fig. 1.7. Similarly to the near-far effect game
without power control, player 1’s best strategy is represented by p1 = p whatever p2 is, since
t − z > λt − ηz under the assumption t ≫ z. As a consequence, player 2 rationally chooses
to play p2 = ηp. The pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is represented by the strategy (p, ηp),
whereas the Pareto-optimal solutions are (p, ηp) and (ηp, p). We appear to be back to the
original situation we had without power control, since at the Nash equilibrium player 2 is
unable to transmit.
The inefficiency of this scheme can be measured in terms of social optimality. Although
formally different from the Pareto-optimal solution, the social-optimal solution is strongly
2Note that η < λ in all practical scenarios, since the performance in terms of correct detection does not
show a linear dependence on the transmit power.
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Figure 1.7: Payoff matrix for the near-far effect game with power control and variable throughput.
connected with the efficiency of a certain strategy in terms of the overall performance of
the network. In other words, the social-optimal solution provides a measure of the maximal
revenue of the network as a whole assuming that the terminals act according to a cooperative
scheme rather than choose their action selfishly. As can be seen in the next chapters, we
will use this notion to measure the inefficiency of the outcome of distributed schemes. In the
specific case of the near-far effect game with variable throughput, a solution is socially optimal
if the overall utility unetwork (p1, p2) = u1 (p1, p2) + u2 (p1, p2) is a maximum. We see that
(p, ηp), in spite of being Pareto-optimal, does not represent the best solution for the network
as a whole, since the overall utility is unetwork (p, ηp) = t − (1 + η) z < 2λt − (1 + η) z =
unetwork (ηp, p). Hence, the Nash equilibrium is not desirable in a social sense.
We can make this situation considerably better by resorting to a dynamic game [20]: a game
in which players are allowed to have a sequential interaction, meaning that the move of one
player is conditioned by the previous moves in the game. Since the main focus of this thesis
is on satic games, this kind of game will be omitted (more precisely, the games discussed in
this thesis are actually a special case of dynamic games, however the main definitions and
theoretical results lie in the field of static games). It is easy to see that (p, ηp) is the best
strategy for player 1 in a one-move (static) game only. If the near-far effect game of Fig. 1.7
is played with several moves, player 1 will choose the strategy p1 = ηp. To see the motivation
for this, assume that 1/λ is an integer for the sake of simplicity (the same conclusions hold
even when such assumption is not verified). If the players play (ηp, p) for 1/λ times, player
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1 achieves a total utility (λt − ηz) /λ = t − ηz/λ, which is greater than t − z due to η < λ.
The only disadvantage is an increased transmission time, which is not necessarily a negative
feature (it actually is only for delay-sensitive applications, which call for different utility
functions).
Chapter 2
System outline
2.1 Transmitted signals format
In this thesis, we will focus on TH systems, where the multiple access is performed by using
a pseudo-random TH sequence for each user. The information is conveyed by either the
position or the polarity of an ultrashort pulse, which correspond to Pulse Position Modu-
lation (PPM) and Binary Phase-Shift Keying (BPSK), respectively. Each pulse is called a
“monocycle” and has a basic shape given by the time-derivative of a Gaussian waveform. We
will consider polarity randomization [12] which reduces the MAI and optimizes the spectral
shape according to FCC/ECC specifications. With this technique, each monocycle has a
random polarity code in addition to data modulation.
In the uplink of a multiaccess UWB infrastructured network, we consider code acquisition on
a pilot channel (i.e., either with no data modulation or modulated with known data) of UWB
randomized TH-IR system with K users sharing the same channel to communicate with a
common AP. Using baseband-equivalent representation, the signal transmitted by each user
i can be expressed as [13]
si(t) =
√
2pi
Mf
∑
n
gi(t− nTb) (2.1)
where pi is the i -th user’s transmit power, whose maximum value is determined according to
PSD regulations, Mf is the number of frames per bit period Tb, and where
gi(t) =
M−1∑
m=0
di,⌊m/Mc⌋ · ω(t− ⌊m/Mc⌋Tf − ei,⌊m/Mc⌋Tc) (2.2)
is the i -th user’s signature (bandlimited) waveform. In this definition:
• ω(t) is a Square Root Raised Cosine (SRRC) pulse with energy Tc, whose duration Tc
is on the order of tens or hundreds of nanoseconds;
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• Tf is the period of a frame (Tb =MfTf );
• Mc is the number of slots into which each frame is partitioned, representing the Mc
possible positions of a pulse; the width of each time slot is Tc;
• as a consequence, M =Mc ·Mf is the total spreading factor inherent in UWB signaling
(Tb =MTc);
• the operator ⌊·⌋ indicates the integer part of its argument, so that ⌊m/Mc⌋ represents
the time index of each frame;
• di =
{
di,0, · · · , di,Mf−1
}
is the polarity code, where di,m ∈ {±1} with probability 1/2;
and
• ei =
{
ei,0, · · · , ei,Mf−1
}
is the TH sequence, where ei,m ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,Mc− 1} with equal
probability.
Definition (2.2) can be rewritten in a more compact form as follows
gi(t) =
M−1∑
m=0
ci,m · ω(t−mTc), (2.3)
where we have defined
ci,m ,
{
di,⌊m/Mc⌋, ei,⌊m/Mc⌋Mc = m− ⌊m/Mc⌋Mc,
0, otherwise.
(2.4)
Definition (2.4) is a formal way to state that the “chips” of the spreading sequence ci,m are 0
when no pulse is sent in the corresponding slot, and is equal to the pulse polarity (±1) when
the pulse is active. Hence, ci = {ci,m}M−1m=0 denotes the spreading code for user i, which is
assumed to be random, with ci,m ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, and
E{ci,m · ci,m+ℓ} =
{
1, (ℓ = 0) ∧ (ci,m = ±1)
0, ℓ 6= 0
(2.5)
E{ci,m · cj,m+ℓ} = 0, ∀i 6= j, ∀ℓ, (2.6)
where E{·} denotes statistical expectation.
It is also of interest to highlight the relationship between our (randomized) IR-UWB and
traditional Random-CDMA, that is, DS/SS signaling with long pseudo-random spreading
codes. The resemblance with CDMA is apparent. The main difference is that the spreading
sequence is ternary rather than binary as in conventional DS/SS. Also, the binary chips
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Figure 2.1: A comparison between TH-UWB and CDMA
of traditional spreading codes for DS/SS are approximately delta-correlated, in fact, (2.4)
simply becomes
E{ci,m · ci,m+ℓ} =
{
1, ℓ = 0
0, ℓ 6= 0
(2.7)
while the values of the sequence ci,m have a correlation pattern dictated by the TH sequence.
We have strict coincidence of IR-UWB and DS/SS only when Mc = 1 (i.e., without TH). To
pose Mc = 1 implicates Tf = Tc, and the ternary sequence ci reduces to a binary sequence
with independent chips ci,m = ±1. As a consequence, the sufficient statistic for detecting
information symbols can be written similarly to that of classical CDMA systems. Fig. 2.1
shows a simple example: a comparison between a TH-UWB with Mc = 4 and CDMA (Mc =
1), keeping Mf = 3 and polarity code {1,−1, 1}.
2.2 Frequency-selective channel
Due to their extremely large bandwidths, UWB signals have a much higher temporal reso-
lution than conventional narrowband or wideband signals. As a consequence, the multipath
channel experienced by such signals is extremely “rich”, i.e., crowded with hundreds of
resolvable propagation paths in an indoor environment. Our channel model is a conventional
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tapped-delay line [32,33]:
πk(t) =
L∑
l=1
αk,lδ(t− (l − 1)Tc − τk), (2.8)
where L is the number of channel paths, and αk = [αk,l, . . . , αk,L]
T are the fading coefficients.
Our model also captures the different overall propagation delay τk of user k, that we suppose
for simplicity to be an integer multiple of the chip interval Tc: τk = ∆kTc, for every k,
where ∆k is uniformly distributed in {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1}. Really, this approximation has to
be considered valid for limited band signals such as in the CDMA scenario, whereas is more
inadequate for unlimited signals such as in the UWB scenario. We also assume that the
channel characteristics remain unchanged over several symbol intervals [13].
2.3 PRake receiver
The radio signal in a wireless mobile communications system operating in an urban or indoor
environment experiences the phenomenon of multipath propagation. In such scenario the
signal can propagate from the transmitter to the receiver through a number of different
propagation paths. The different paths (or rays) are due to reflection and scattering on
walls, buildings, trees, furniture, and other surfaces or obstacles. A simple model for the
received signal at the receiving end, assuming perfect carrier frequency synchronization, is
thus
r(t) =
L∑
l=1
αlsl(t− τl) + η(t), (2.9)
where sl(t) is the baseband equivalent of the transmitted DS/SS signal, αl is a complex fading
coefficient, τl is the propagation delay on the l-th respective path, L is the number of paths,
and η(t) is the usual channel noise term.
In (2.9) we assumed that the channel parameters (amplitudes, phase shifts, and delays) are
constant in time, but this may not be the case for mobile communications at high speed. In
an urban environment, the amplitude coefficient is usually modeled as a Rayleigh random
variable, while the phase shift is assumed to be uniformly distributed over (0, 2π). Tipical
values of the delays τl are 1÷ 10µs for rural environments, 0.1÷ 1µs for urban scenarios, and
1 ÷ 100 ns for indoor propagation. In general, the channel amplitude and phase responses
reveal considerably variable over the signal bandwidth, thus causing non-negligible distorion
on the received signal: we have a frequency-selective channel (as illustrated in Sect. 2.2). The
work developed in this thesis is on a frequency-selective scenario, nevertheless we consider
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Figure 2.2: Generic acquisition receiver scheme
the just mentioned parameters as constant in time because of a slow-fading channel. In
a multipath scenario, every multipath component can be viewed as indipendently fading,
thereby providing a high degree of diversity (delay diversity, frequency diversity) for the
transmission. However, in order to utilize the available diversity, the receiver must be able to
resolve (i.e., to extract and process) the different multipath components. The Rake receiver,
whose block diagram is depicted in Fig. 2.2, is a kind of time diversity receiver made of a bank
of L identical conventional DS/SS detectors (using the serial serch technique) operating in
parallel and called fingers (just like the fingers of a gardener’s rake). In the code acquisition
phase, DS/SS demodulator 1 tries to locate the first arriving path within the multipath signal,
by finding the correlation peak of the local code replica with the received signal, and tunes
onto it. After this, the second detector will try to find the second arriving path and lock onto
it, and so forth. To achieve this, they carry out a continuos search around the previously
found locations, in particular looking for secondary correlation peaks generated by weaking
signal echoes. The search range is limited to a few chip intervals, depending on the maximum
channel delay the receiver has to cope with. Eventually, each finger of the Rake locks onto
a different time-delayed replica of the incoming signal, correlates it with a properly shifted
version of the local code replica, and yields a decision strobe at symbol rate. This operation
mode presumes that the different signal replicas (echoes) can be resolved, i.e., they can be
singled out by a correlation procedure. This is true only when the difference between the
various signal delays is greater than one chip time. In this case, the different signal echoes
on the different propagation paths turn out to be uncorrelated (due to the properties of the
spreading code), and they can be resolved via correlation processing.
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Assume now for simplicity that finger 1 locks onto path 1, finger 2 onto path 2, and so forth.
The different partial-decision variables enters in a Selection-Combinig block whose aim is to
provide a final decision strobe for data detection. The selection/combining criterion may be
one of the following:
i) Selection Combining (SC), where the maximum-amplitude strobe is selected;
ii) Equal Gain Combining (EGC), where all strobes at the finger outputs are summed up
(upon carrier phase counterrotation);
iii) Maximal Ratio Combining (MRC), where all strobes at the finger outputs are summed
up in a weighted manner;
It can be shown that MRC maximizes the SNR at the Rake output, since it implements a
channel-matched filter. In fact the Rake represents the optimum receiver for DS/SS single-
user reception over a multipath channel, provided that all the following conditions are met:
i) the number of Rake fingers is exactly equal to that of the propagation paths;
ii) the Rake can resolve all the paths (i.e., each finger locks onto a different path);
iii) InterChip Interference (ICI) is negligible (i.e., perfect fine time recovery is carried out);
iv) the spreading code is ”Delta-correlated” (i.e., it has null off-zero autocorrelation).
According to conditions 1 and 2, the number of fingers in the Rake should be equal to
the number of resolvable paths in the channel. In practice, a reasonable trade-off between
complexity and multipath robustness is represented in many cases by the choice L =3 [34],
[35].
A Rake receiver can exploit the high degree of diversity that results from a large number of
multipath components. Combining all resolvable paths as in the All-Rake (ARake) receiver
provides the optimal performance [36]. However, the number of multipath components that
can be utilized in a tipical Rake combiner is limited by power consumption constraints, com-
plexity considerations, and the availability of channel estimates. In typical UWB scenarios,
the available number of multipath components at the reciever is often more than 100 [36];
hence the ARake UWB receiver serves only as a benchmark and provides a bound on the
performance that is achievable by other suboptimal combining schemes. The complexity can
be reduced, at the price of a performance penalty, by employing the SelectiveRake (SRake)
receiver. This suboptimal receiver combines the instantaneously strongest L paths out of the
available resolved multipath components. The SRake provides a reduction in the number
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of correlators and thus reduces power consumption respect to an ARake. However, the
selection procedure still requires full channel estimation, which may not be easily available.
Another opportunity is provided by the PartialRake (PRake) receiver, which combines the
first arriving L paths out of the available resolved multipath components. The suboptimal
PRake receivers do not require a complete channel estimation or a full adaptability, but only
synchronization. Nevertheless, in spite of a lower complexity, PRake performances are com-
parable respect to an SRake, expecially on particular channel condition as the one considered
in this work, i.e., the exponentially decaying aPDPs (averaged Power Delay Profiles) [36].
To get round of the problem of digital signaling over a frequency-selective channel that is
modeled by a tapped delay line with statistically independent time-variant tap weights βk,
we consider an AP that uses K Rake receivers [37] (perfect channel estimation is considered
throughout the thesis for ease of calculation).
The Rake receiver for user k is characterized by the L coefficients collected into the vector
βk =G ·αk = [βk,1, . . . , βk,L]T , which represents the combining weights for user k, and where
the L× L matrix G depends on the type of Rake receiver employed. In particular, if G is a
deterministic diagonal matrix, where
{G}ll =

1, 1 ≤ l ≤ r · L,0, elsewhere, (2.10)
with r , LP/L and 0 < LP ≤ L, then this receiver is a PRake with LP fingers using MRC.
Note that, when r = 1, this receiver becomes an ARake.
In the uplink of a multiaccess UWB infrastructured network, we assume for simplicity the
presence of L equi-format users with binary signaling and common spreading factor M (i.e.,
the transmission bit rate Rb = 1/Tb is common among all users, where Tb = MTc is the bit
time and Tc is the chip time), while no data modulation is present. The transmission takes
place over a frequency-selective and slow-fading Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN)
channel. Assuming perfect carrier frequency synchronization, we express the received signal
at the receiving end, as
r(t) =
K∑
i=1
LP∑
q=1
αi,qsi(t− τi) + η(t), (2.11)
where αi,q , hi,qejθi,q is the fading coefficient, more precisely, hi,q and θi,q are the attenuation
and the phase offset, respectively, experienced by the i -th user’s signal when propagating
through the q-th path of the multipath wireless channel; τi is the i -th user’s delay; and
η(t) represents the zero-mean complex-valued AWGN with two-sided Power Spectral Density
(PSD) 2N0. To simplify our problem, we concentrate on a chip-synchronous scenario, i.e., the
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Figure 2.3: PRake receiver: acquisition scheme
unknown signal delay to be estimated is an integer multiple of the chip interval Tc : τi = ∆iTc
for every i, where the code shift ∆i introduced by the channel is uniformly distributed in
{0, 1, . . . ,M−1}. After chip-matched filtering and sampling, the received signal at the uplink
receiver on the l-th finger can be represented as
xl[d] = r(t)⊗ 1
Tc
√
Mf
ω(−t)
∣∣∣∣
t=(d+l−1)Tc
=
K∑
i=1
LP∑
q=1
√
2pi
Mf
hi,qe
jθi,qci,d−∆i−(q−l) + ν[d]
(2.12)
where ν[d] = νI [d]+jνQ[d] is Gaussian-distributed, with indipendent components νI [d], νQ[d] ∼
N (0, σ2ν), and σ2ν = N0/TcMf is the noise power of each component.
Coming back to the infrastructure configuration, in order for the Base Station (BS) to lock
the spreading codes of all K users in the network, the receiver is equipped with K detectors
to search for the correct code shifts ∆k for all k ∈ [1, . . . ,K]. The simplest technique that can
be employed is the serial search sketched in Fig. 2.3 for user k. At this point, the following
signal elaborations are despreading and phase counterrotation, hence, on the l-th finger we
have
yk,l[d]|∆˜k = xl[d]
(
hk,le
−jθk,lck,d−∆˜k
)
=
K∑
i=1
LP∑
q=1
√
2pi
Mf
hi,qhk,le
jθi,qe−jθk,lci,d−∆i−(q−l)ck,d−∆˜k + ζ
(AWGN)
l [d],
(2.13)
where we have defined the AWGN noise contribution
ζ
(AWGN)
l [d] , ν[d]
(
hk,le
−jθk,lck,d−∆˜k
)
. (2.14)
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Note the introduction of the conditioning to the tentative code shift ∆˜k of the locally
generated sequence ck (we will shortly better explain that). The receiver for user k must
estimate the k ’s transmit power pk and channel fading for each finger αk,l. For the sake of
analysis, we are supposing perfect estimation of both values. After accumulation over a code
length NM (where N is the number of Tb intervals in the acquisition period), we get
wk,l[n]|∆˜k = 1
N
NM−1∑
d=0
yk,l[d]|∆˜k
=
1
N
(NMf )
√
2pk
Mf
h2k,lµk +
1
N
NM−1∑
d=0
{
ζ
(SI)
l [d] + ζ
(MAI)
l [d] + ζ
(AWGN)
l [d]
}
,
(2.15)
in which the term outside braces represents the Signal Part (SP), the first term inside braces
is the Self Interference (SI) term, i.e., the effect of the cross-term that arises between the
output of the propagation path αl,k and the m-th Rake coefficient βm,k, m 6= l; the second
one is the Multiple Access Interference (MAI) term due to the MAI of users i 6= k, and the
last one is the just cited AWGN noise term, for each finger. This equation derives from some
easy calculations and some definitions introduction to obtain a more compact notation. We
have broken equation (2.13) in more terms depending on summations and variables indexes:
when (q = l) ∧ (i = k) we obtain the SP, where
µk =
{
1, ∆˜k = ∆k
0, ∆˜k 6= ∆k
(2.16)
(or, analogously, µk = δ∆˜k∆k using the δ of Kronecker), when (q 6= l) ∧ (i = k) the SI arises,
and we define it as
ζ
(SI)
l [d] ,
LP∑
q=1
q 6=l
√
2pk
Mf
hk,qhk,le
j[θk,q−θk,l]ck,d−∆k−(q−l)ck,d−∆˜k ; (2.17)
otherwise, ∀q ∧ (i 6= k) the MAI arises, defining it as
ζ
(MAI)
l [d] ,
K∑
i=1
i 6=k
LP∑
q=1
√
2pi
Mf
hi,qhk,le
j[θi,q−θk,l]ci,d−∆i−(q−l)ck,d−∆˜k . (2.18)
Applying the MCR at the LP fingers output and normalizing the resulting value, we obtain
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the final decision strobe for data detection, that is
wk[n]|∆˜k = 1√
2pkh
(SP)
k
LP∑
l=1
wk,l[n]|∆˜k
=
1
√
2pkh
(SP)
k
{
LP∑
l=1
√
2pkh
2
k,lµk +
1
N
NM−1∑
d=0
{
ζ(SI)[d] + ζ(MAI)[d] + ζ(AWGN)[d]
}}
,
(2.19)
in which a new variable h
(SP)
k has been introduced.
Using a matricial form, we define the following quantities [13,38]:
h
(SP)
k = β
H
k · αk, (2.20)
h
(SI)
k =
1
M
∣∣∣∣Φ · (BHk · αk +AHk · βk)∣∣∣∣2
βHk · αk
, (2.21)
h
(MAI)
ki =
1
M
∣∣∣∣BHk · αi∣∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣∣AHi · βk∣∣∣∣2 + ∣∣βHk ·αi∣∣2
βHk · αk
, (2.22)
respectively, where the matrices
Ak =


αL,k · · · · · · α2,k
0 αL,k · · · α3,k
...
. . .
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 αL,k
0 · · · · · · 0


, (2.23)
Bk =


βL,k · · · · · · β2,k
0 βL,k · · · β3,k
...
. . .
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 βL,k
0 · · · · · · 0


, (2.24)
Φ = diag {φ1, . . . , φL−1} , (2.25)
with
φl =
√
min{L− l,Mc}
Mc
, (2.26)
have been introduced for convenience of notation.
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Now we statistically analyse equation (2.19) putting particular attention to the noise and
interference terms inside it. The AWGN contribution is given by
ζ(AWGN)[d] = ζ
(AWGN)
I [d] + jζ
(AWGN)
Q [d], (2.27)
where
ζ
(AWGN)
I [d], ζ
(AWGN)
Q [d] ∼ N
(
0, σ2AWGN
)
, (2.28)
and
σ2AWGN =
NMf
N2
σ2ν |αk,l|2[√
2pkh
(SP)
k
]2 . (2.29)
By virtue of the central-limit theorem, the term due to the SI can be approximated to a
Gaussian random variable
ζ(SI)[d] = ζ
(SI)
I [d] + jζ
(SI)
Q [d], (2.30)
where
ζ
(SI)
I [d], ζ
(SI)
Q [d] ∼ N
(
0, σ2SI
)
, (2.31)
and
σ2SI =
NMf
Mc(NMf )2
pk[√
2pkh
(SP)
k
]2
LP−1∑
l=1
{∣∣∣ l∑
t=1
αk,tβ
∗
k,t+L−l
∣∣∣2+∣∣∣ l∑
t=1
βk,tα
∗
k,t+L−l
∣∣∣2}. (2.32)
Thanks to central-limit theorem again, the MAI term can be approximated to a Gaussian
random variable too
ζ(MAI)[d] = ζ
(MAI)
I [d] + jζ
(MAI)
Q [d], (2.33)
where
ζ
(MAI)
I [d], ζ
(MAI)
Q [d] ∼ N
(
0, σ2MAI
)
, (2.34)
and
σ2MAI =
NMf
Mc(NMf )2
pi[√
2pkh
(SP)
k
]2
{∣∣∣LP−1∑
l=1
l∑
t=1
αi,tβ
∗
k,t+L−l
∣∣∣2+∣∣∣LP−1∑
l=1
l∑
t=1
βi,tα
∗
k,t+L−l
∣∣∣2+∣∣∣ LP∑
t=1
αi,tβ
∗
k,t
∣∣∣2}.
(2.35)
Also the final decision strobe can be expressed as a Gaussian random variable
wk[n]|∆˜k = wI,k[n]|∆˜k + jwQ,k[n]|∆˜k, (2.36)
where
wI,k[n]|∆˜k, wQ,k[n]|∆˜k ∼ N
(
µk, σ
2
w
)
, (2.37)
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and finally, making use of the (2.20, 2.21, 2.22)
σ2w = σ
2
AWGN + σ
2
SI + σ
2
MAI
=
1
NM
[√
2pkh
(SP)
k
]2
{
MMfσ
2
νh
(SP)
k +Mpkh
(SP)
k h
(SI)
k +
∑
i 6=k
Mpih
(SP)
k h
(MAI)
ki
}
=
1
2Npkh
(SP)
k
{
σ2 + pkh
(SI)
k +
∑
i 6=k
pih
(MAI)
ki
}
=
1
2Nγk
(2.38)
where σ2 , Mfσ2ν = N0/Tc is the output variance due to residual ambient AWGN after
despreading, and γk is the Signal plus Interference Noise Ratio (SINR) of the k-th user at the
output of the Rake receiver. It can be well approximated (for large Mf , typically, at least 5)
by [13]
γk =
h
(SP)
k pk
h
(SI)
k pk +
K∑
i=1,i 6=k
h
(MAI)
ki pi + σ
2
. (2.39)
We have just underlined the contidioning of the final strobe to ∆˜k. This dependence is
evident looking at Fig. 2.3, in which the battery of multipliers aimed to despread the received
signal are piloted by the code shifter block. To decide whether the k-th receiver is in-sync or
out-of-sync, the output wk[n]|∆˜k is compared with a detection threshold λk[n] ∈ [0, 1]. In the
case the test fails, i.e., if wk[n]|∆˜k < λk[n], then a new tentative code shift ∆˜k is selected for
the PN sequence generation. If the synchronization test is passed, i.e., if wk[n]|∆˜k > λk[n],
then the receiver assumes that the tentative delay ∆˜k of the locally generated PN sequence
is the correct delay ∆k and proceeds to verification mode [39], [40]. This process aims
at avoiding false code locks, which are extremely detrimental for the receiver in terms of
increased time for correct synchronization and subsequent data detection. For convenience of
notation, we will drop the dependence of quantities such as decision statistics and threshold
on the symbol index n from now on. However robust, verification is expensive in terms of
time and processing resources. Hence, a key performance indicator of the acquisition strategy
is given by the probability of false alarm, defined as
PFA(γk, λk) = Pr
{
wk > λk|∆˜k 6= ∆k
}
=
∫ +∞
λk
fW |∆˜k 6=∆k(w)dw, (2.40)
to be kept as low as possible. The twin performance parameter that fully characterizes the
sync procedure is the probability of detection, defined as
PD(γk, λk) = Pr
{
wk > λk|∆˜k = ∆k
}
=
∫ +∞
λk
fW |∆˜k=∆k(w)dw, (2.41)
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which on the contrary should be as high as possible, since a missed detection implies a much
longer acquisition time and thus a significant delay in the receiving chain. In our definitions
above, we expressed PFA and PD as explicit functions not only of the tentative code shift but
also of the SINR γk through the variance of wk. From equations (2.40)-(2.41) we can extract
general requirements for synchronization strategies to be amenable to our game-theoretic
analysis. The following properties are required:
P1. both PFA and PD must decrease as λk increases for a fixed SINR γk, for all k ∈ [1, . . . ,K];
P2. PFA decreases as γk increases for a fixed threshold λk, for all k ∈ [1, . . . ,K], with
limγk→+∞ PFA = 0;
P3. PD increases as γk increases for a fixed threshold λk, for all k ∈ [1, . . . ,K], with
limγk→+∞ PD = 1;
P4. PD is a concave function of both λk and γk.
The requirement P1 is a reasonable assumption, since, for a fixed SINR, increasing λk
means increasing the lower interval of the integrals (2.40)-(2.41), thus reducing the interval
of integration. Similarly, P2 and P3 appear to be reasonable, since increasing γk tightens the
probability density function (pdf) arounds its mean value, which is 0 in case of wrong code
shift and 1 in case of correct code shift. Finally, P4 is expedient to ensure many properties
of the proposed analysis. For a verification of these properties, refer to Appendix A. Under
these assumptions, the performance of the considered system model, measured in terms of
probabilities of detection and false alarm, increases as the SINR increases. However, as follows
from (2.39), achieving a higher SINR implies transmitting at a higher power. This affects
the energy consumption, which is higly undesirable, especially for battery-powered terminals.
Hence, there exists a tradeoff between good synchronization performance on one side, and
low energy consumption on the other one.

Chapter 3
Theory
3.1 Formulation of the game
To capture the tradeoff between obtaining good synchronization performance and saving as
much energy as possible, we quantify the energy efficiency achieved by the k-th tx-rx link
through a utility function defined as the ratio of the probability of detection PD to the
transmitted energy per acquisition trial E
(t)
k = pk · τA = pk · NTb, where τA = NTb is the
acquisition time:
uk (p, λk) = uk
(
[pk,p\k], λk
)
=
PD(γk, λk)
pk · τA =
PD(γk, λk)
pk ·NTb , (3.1)
where p\k = p \ pk = [p1, · · · , pk−1, pk+1, · · · , pK ]. Note that the utility function has units
of J−1. In this formulation, each k-th tx-rx pair can set its own transmit power pk (at
the tx side) and detection threshold λk (at the rx side). All active links aim at increasing
their utilities based on their parameters (transmit power, detection threshold). Using (2.39),
we can easily verify that γk depends not only on pk, but also on all other users’ transmit
powers p\k. As a consequence, maximizing uk (p, λk) is not a unilateral optimization, rather
it is a multidimensional and multicriteria optimization problem. In this context, we can
formulate a noncooperative game with complete information [25] in which every tx-rx pair
(the player) seeks to maximize its own utility by choosing an optimum pair (transmit power,
threshold). Let G = [K, {Ak}, {uk}] be such game, in which K = {1, · · · ,K} is the player set;
Ak = Pk × Λk is player k’s strategy set, where Pk is the power set, and Λk is the threshold
set; and uk is player k’s payoff function. The power set is Pk = [pk, pk], with pk and pk
denoting the minimum and maximum power constraints, respectively. In Chapter 4, we will
assume p
k
= 0 and pk = p for all k ∈ K, with p sufficiently large. The threshold strategy set
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is Λk = [0, 1] for all receivers k ∈ K. The solution of G can be expressed as1
[p∗k, λ
∗
k] = arg max
pk∈Pk=[0,pk],λk∈Λk=[0,1]
uk (p, λk), (3.2)
where uk (p, λk) is defined as in (3.1). For convenience of notation, we define
I0,k ,
K∑
i=1,i 6=k
h
(MAI)
ki pi (3.3)
and substitute it into the (2.39), obtaining
γk =
h
(SP)
k pk
h
(SI)
k pk + I0,k + σ
2
, (3.4)
and inverting it, we get
pk = γk · I0,k + σ
2
h
(SP)
k − γkh(SI)k
. (3.5)
As is, the formulation (3.2) is ill-posed, since it leads to an undesirable solution: when γk → 0,
i.e., pk → 0 (look at (3.5)), we get Var{wI,k},Var{wQ,k} → +∞ (as clear from 2.38), where
Var{·} is the variance operator. In this case, for any λk ∈ Λk, PD(γk, λk) > 0. This means
that, based on (3.1), a user can potentially achieve infinite utility by transmitting zero power.
A way out of this impasse can be found by placing further constraints, so as to formulate a
constrained game G′. As already mentioned, not only missed detection but also false code
locks impair the system performance. To limit the occurrence of spurious wrong detections,
we require a maximum probability of false alarm PFA to obtain a new game G′ as follows:
[p∗k, λ
∗
k] = arg max
pk∈Pk=[0,pk],λk∈Λk=[0,1]
uk (p, λk) s.t. PFA(γk, λk) ≤ PFA. (3.6)
Note that the only difference between games G, described by (3.2), and G′, represented by
(3.6), is due to the presence of the constraints on the maximum probability of false alarm.
In some sense, PFA represents the system’s QoS requirement, that depends on its desired
accuracy. A more compact form to express pk(γk) is obtained introducing two new definitions
ξk ,
h
(SP)
k
I0,k + σ2
, (3.7)
ϕk ,
I0,k + σ
2
h
(SI)
k
, (3.8)
1The solution to this problem is not necessarily unique, as the arg max operator provides a whole set of
values as its output. The equality symbols thus accounts for all possible values that provide the maximum of
the utility function.
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and elaborating (3.5) to get
p−1k =
h
(SP)
k
γk(I0,k + σ2)
− h
(SI)
k
I0,k + σ2
=
ξk
γk
− 1
ϕk
. (3.9)
The utility function now can be rewrite as follows:
uk (p, λk) =
1
NTb
PD(γk, λk)
[
ξk
γk
− 1
ϕk
]
. (3.10)
For convenience of notation again, we define γk , γk(pk), i.e., the maximum SINR value
deriving from the maximum power constraint. Considering the dependence of pk on γk, we
can reformulate the game G′:
[γ∗k , λ
∗
k] = arg max
γk∈[0,γk],λk∈[0,1]
1
NTb
PD(γk, λk)
[
ξk
γk
− 1
ϕk
]
s.t. PFA(γk, λk) ≤ PFA. (3.11)
Including the constraint of the maximum probability of false alarm means restricting the
strategy space to the subset A′k ⊂ [0, pk] × [0, 1] that provides PFA(γk, λk) ≤ PFA. Since
PFA is assumed to decrease as both λk and γk increase (properties P1 and P2), we can identify
γ = γ(PFA) (3.12)
as the minimum SINR that provides PFA(γ, λk = 1) = PFA, using the largest threshold
λk = 1. Given any γk ∈ [γ, γk], a subset [λk(γk), 1] ∈ Λk that fulfills PFA(γk, λk) ≤ PFA can
be also obtained using similar arguments. Since PFA is a decreasing function of λk, we define
λk(γk) = λ(γk, γ) (3.13)
as the smallest threshold such that PFA(γk, λk = λk(γk)) = PFA. To better visualize the
problem, Fig. 3.1 provides a pictorial representation of a typical strategy set A′k = A
′
k(p\k)
(shaded region, including its contour) for a given PFA, where we have explicitly introduced
the dependence of the strategy set on the power allocation of all users but user k through
the coefficients ξk and γ0,k, where
γ0,k ,
h
(SP)
k
h
(SI)
k
(3.14)
and, in particular, the maximum power value
p
k
=
ξ−1k
(γ−1 − γ−10,k)
. (3.15)
Note that, since each strategy set A′k(p\k) depends on the opponents’ strategies p\k, the
game G′ is a generalized Nash game [41].
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1
pkξ
−1
k /(γ
−1 − γ−10,k)
PFA(γ, λk) < PFA
PFA(γ, λk) = PFA
λk = λ
(
(p−1
k ξ−1k + γ−1
0,k )
−1, γ
)
Figure 3.1: A typical strategy set A′k over the resource plan Pk × Λk
We can now reformulate (3.11) in a more compact form:
[γ∗k , λ
∗
k] = arg max
γk∈[γ,γk],λk∈[λk(γk),1]
1
NTb
PD(γk, λk)
[
ξk
γk
− 1
ϕk
]
. (3.16)
The maximization (3.16) can be further simplified by considering the decreasing behaviour
of PD with an increasing λk (property P1). Since PD(γk, λk = λk(γk)) > PD(γk, λk) for any
λk > λk(γk), our problem becomes a function of the SINR γk only:
γ∗k = arg max
γk∈[γ,γk]
1
NTb
PD(γk, γ)
[
ξk
γk
− 1
ϕk
]
, (3.17)
where p∗k = [ξk/γ
∗
k − 1/ϕk]−1 and λ∗k = λk(γ∗k). This is equivalent to carry out the maxi-
mization along the boundary of the shaded region in Fig. 3.1. Since there is a one-to-one
correspondence between λk(γk) and γk, we have replaced PD(γk, λk(γk)) with PD(γk, γ). Note
that (3.17) includes:
i) the energy-efficient tradeoff in terms of synchronization performance versus energy con-
sumption;
ii) the chosen strategy;
iii) the QoS constraint in terms of probability of false alarm.
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The RA problem (3.17) will be solved using the tools of game theory
3.2 Analysis of the generalized Nash equilibrium
The solution that is most widely used for generalized noncooperative games is the generalized
Nash equilibrium (GNE) [25]. A GNE is a set of strategies such that no player can unilaterally
improve its own utility. Formally, a vector a∗ = [a∗1, · · · , a∗K ], with a∗k = (p∗k, λ∗k), is a GNE
of G′ if, for all k ∈ K,
uk
(
[p∗k,p
∗
\k], λ
∗
k
)
≥ uk
(
[p∗k,p
∗
\k], λk
)
(3.18)
for all transmit powers pk ∈ Pk and for all thresholds λk ∈ Λk such that PFA(γk, λk) ≤
PFA. The GNE is of particular interest in the context of distributed algorithms, in that
it offers a predictable outcome of a game where multiple agents with conflicting interests
compete through self-optimizaton and reach a point in which no player wishes to deviate
from. Note that our focus throughout this work is on pure (i.e., deterministic) strategies
rather than on mixed (i.e., statistical) strategies [25]. In the latter case, each player can
select a probability distribution for its strategies, and then choose a strategy based on this
probability distribution. However, since there exist no mixed strategy profiles that are more
efficient (in the Pareto2 sense [25]) than any pure-strategy vector [21], we focus on pure
strategies only.
3.2.1 Existence
Theorem 3 Define
γ∗k =

 γ, γ(1 −
γ
γ0,k
) ≤ f(γ, γ),
γ˜k, γ(1 − γγ0,k ) > f(γ, γ),
(3.19)
as the SINR that maximizes user k’s utility function, where γ˜k > γ satisfies the relation
γ˜k(1− γ˜k
γ0,k
) = f(γ˜k, γ), (3.20)
and
f(γk, γ) , PD(γk, γ)/P
′
D(γk, γ), (3.21)
with P ′D(γk, γ) = dPD(γk, γ)/dγk. Then , the game G′ admits (at least) one pure-strategy
GNE if and only if
γ∗k(γ0,k
−1 + ζk−1) < 1 ∀k ∈ K, (3.22)
2In game theory parlance, a strategy profile is said to be more efficient (or Pareto-dominant) if it is possible
to increase the utility of some of the players without hurting any other player.
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where ζk ,
∑
i 6=k(h
(SP)
i /h
(MAI)
ki ).
Proof The game G′ belongs to the category of infinite games [25], since the joint set of strate-
giesA′(p) = ×kA′k(p\k), withA′k(p\k) =
[
ξ−1k /(γ
−1 − γ−10,k), pk
]
×
[
λk[(ξ
−1
k p
−1
k + γ
−1
0,k)
−1], 1
]
⊂
Ak, is infinite (uncountable). The existence of pure-strategy GNEs can be proved using the
results from [27–29, 41, 42]. In particular, (at least) one pure-strategy GNE exists in the
noncooperative game G′ if:
a. there exist K nonempty, convex and compact set Ak ⊂ R2 such that, for every a ∈ A =
×kAk and for all k = 1, . . . ,K, A′k(p\k) is nonempty, closed and convex, A′k(p\k) ⊆ Ak,
and A′k(·), as a point-to-set map, is both upper and lower semicontinuous [43]; and
b. uk (p, λk) is continuous in ak = (pk, λk) ∈ A′k and quasi-concave in ak for all k =
1, . . . ,K.
Given PFA, we can identify A′k(p\k) =
[
ξ−1k /(γ
−1 − γ−10,k), pk
]
×
[
λk[(ξ
−1
k p
−1
k + γ
−1
0,k)
−1], 1
]
over the bidimensional resource plan (transmit power, threshold) available for the k-th tx-rx
pair. A pictorial representation of a typical A′k is given by the shadowed area, including its
contour, of Fig. 3.1. In our case, condition a reduces to verify:
i) the existence of K convex and compact sets A′k ⊂ Ak such that, for every a = (p,λ) ∈
A′, A′k(p\k) is nonempty and closed; and
ii) the upper and lower semicontinuity of the point-to-set mapping A′k(·).
Convexity and compactness follow from the definition of A′k. Nonemptyness is verified
provided that p
k
= ξ−1k /(γ
−1 − γ−10,k) < pk. Since γ ≤ γ∗k by hypothesis, it is sufficient
to show that γ∗k =
[
(p∗k)
−1ξ−1k + γ
−1
0,k
]−1
< γk for all k ∈ K. This means that the target
SINR γ∗k can be achieved by all users while meeting their own QoS requirements. Let us now
assume that a GNE exists in G′. At the equilibrium we have
γ∗k =
h
(SP)
k p
∗
k
h
(SI)
k p
∗
k +
K∑
i=1,i 6=k
h
(MAI)
ki p
∗
i + σ
2
=
h
(SP)
k p
∗
k
h
(SP)
k p
∗
k · γ0,k−1 + h(SP)i p∗i · ζ−1k + σ2
=
ωk
ωkγ0,k−1 + ωiζ−1k + σ2
,
(3.23)
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where we have defined ωk , h
(SP)
k p
∗
k ≥ 0. To simplify the analysis, let us assume the typical
case of multiuser UWB systems, where M ≫ K. Under this constraint, we can assume that
ωk ≃ ω ∀k ∈ K, obtaining
γ∗k ≃
ω
ωγ−10,k + ωζ
−1
k + σ
2
. (3.24)
This heuristic hypothesis has been validated through numerical simulations in [38]. Now,
expressing ω as a function of the other parameters and remembering that it is a positive
quantity, (3.24) yields the (3.22), proving its necessity. Conversely, if every terminal k enforces
ω =
γ∗kσ
2
1− γ∗k(γ0,k−1 + ζ−1k )
, (3.25)
then all terminals achieve the SINR requirement γ∗k, proving sufficiency (the proof is straight-
forward, substituting (3.25) into (3.24) yields an identity function).
As a conclusion, when (3.22) holds, A′k is nonempty and closed for all k ∈ K. Finally,
the properties of upper and lower semicontinuity of the point-to-set mapping are a natural
consequence of the continuity of the function λk(·) that describes the boundary of the strategy
set A′k.
To verify condition b, we can take advantage of (3.16). Since γk ∈ [γ, γk], with 0 < γk < γk,
it is apparent that uk (p, λk) is continuous over Ak. To show that uk (p, λk) is quasi-concave
in ak ∈ A′k for all k ∈ K, it is sufficient to prove that the local maximum of uk (p, λk) is
at the same time a global maximum [44]. Since PD decreases as λk increases, all maxima
of uk (p, λk) must lay on the contour of A′k, given by pk ∈
[
(ξk/γ − 1/ϕk)−1, pk
]
, λk =
λk
(
(ξk/γ − 1/ϕk)−1
)
. We can thus exploit (3.17) to investigate uk (p, λk(γk)). Let us study
the values of γk such that
u′k (γk) =
d
dγk
uk (p, λk(γk)) =
d
dγk
{
1
NTb
PD(γk, λk)
[
ξk
γk
− 1
ϕk
]}
= 0. (3.26)
Now we can bring out a term independent from γk for greater convenience, then develop the
first derivative and substitute (3.21) into it as follows
NTb · u′k (γk) = P ′D(γk, γ)

− 1
ϕk
+
ξkγk − ξk PD(γk ,γ)P ′D(γk ,γ)
γ2k


= ξk
P ′D(γk, γ)
γ2k
[
− γ
2
k
ϕkξk
+ γk − f(γk, γ)]
]
= 0.
(3.27)
Note that f(γk, γ) is continuous in γk ∈ [γ, γk] owing to P ′D(γk, γ) > 0, which follows from
property P3. In other words, we evaluate γ∗k such that
f(γ∗k, γ) = −
1
ϕkξk
(γ∗k)
2 + γ∗k , (3.28)
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Figure 3.2: An example of equilibrium point
and observing that ϕkξk = h
(SP)
k /h
(SI)
k = γ0,k, it becomes rewritable in a more compact form:
f(γ∗k, γ) = −
1
γ0,k
(γ∗k)
2 + γ∗k . (3.29)
We observe that the function f(·, γ) is an increasing function of γk, with
f ′(γk, γ) =
d
dγk
f(γk, γ) = 1−
PD(γk, γ)P
′′
D(γk, γ)
[P ′D(γk, γ)]2
> 1, (3.30)
where the inequality holds since P ′′D(γk, γ) =
d2
dγk
PD(γk, γ) < 0 for all γk ∈ [γ, γk] (property
P4). In such conditions, the left-hand side of (3.29) has a derivative greater than that of the
right-hand side:
d
dγk
(
− 1
γ0,k
(γk)
2 + γk
)
= − 1
γ0,k
γk + 1
∣∣∣∣
γk=0
= 1. (3.31)
Fig. 3.2 illustrates graphically (3.29) and (3.31).
The solution of (3.29) can be found by studying the sign of u′k (γk) at γk = γ . If u
′
k
(
γ
)
> 0,
then γ > f(γ)γ . Since, from (3.30), f ′(γk, γ) > 1, there exists a unique γ∗k = γ˜k > γ that
satisfies γ˜k = f(γ˜k, γ) in [γ, γk]. The second-order partial derivative du
′
k (γk) /dγk reveals
that this point is a local maximum and thus a global maximum3. If u′k
(
γ
)
≤ 0, then
γ ≤ f(γ)γ . Since f ′(γk, γ) > 1, u′k
(
γ
)
< 0 for all γk ∈ [γ, γk]. Hence, (3.29) is not met
by any γk ∈ [γ, γk], and the global maximum is achieved when γ∗k = γ . The point of global
3We have u′′k(γ
∗
k) < 0.
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maximum γ∗k can be summarized as in (3.19). As a conclusion, the utility function uk (p, γk)
is quasi-concave in γk for all k ∈ K. 
In order to derive some quantitative results for the optimum threshold independent of SI
and MAI, it is possible to resort to a large system analysis. For convenience of notation,
a function Γ(·) is defined such that γ∗k = Γ (γ0,k). Making this substitution, the necessary
condition for the GNE to be achieved simultaneously by all K users, expressed by (3.22),
becomes
Γ (γ0,k) ·
(
γ0,k
−1 + ζk−1
)
< 1 ∀k ∈ K. (3.32)
First of all, we had to properly characterize the UWB systems channel model. For ease of
calculation, we use the following simplifying assumptions:
• The channel gains are zero-mean independent complex Gaussian Random Variables
(RVs) with variances σ2kl , i.e., αl,k ∼ CN (0, σ2kl). This assumption leads |αl,k| to be
Rayleigh-distributed with parameter σ2kl/2 (it has recently been shown [45] to provide
a good approximation for multipath propagation in UWB systems).
• Lately, a clustering phenomenon for the averaged power delay profile (aPDP) [46] in
IR-UWB multipath channels has emerged from a large number of UWB measurement
campaigns [47,48]. However, owing to the analytical difficulties arising when considering
such aspect, this work focuses on an exponentially decaying aPDP, as is customarily
used in several UWB channel models [32,33]. This translates into the hypothesis
σ2kl = σ
2
k · Λ−
l−1
L−1 , (3.33)
where Λ , σ2k1/σ
2
kL
is the aPDP decay constant; and σ2k depends on the distance
between user k and the AP. Fig. 3.3 shows the aPDP for some values of Λ versus the
normalized excess delay, i.e., the ratio between the excess delay lTc, and the maximum
excess delay considered LTc. It is easy to verify that Λ = 0 dB represents the case of
flat aPDP.
In the following, the model described above is employed to obtain closed-form expressions
for the interference when PRake receivers are implemented at the AP.
a. PRake with exponentially decaying aPDP
In the asymptotic case where L,Mc →∞, with the ratioMc/L approaching a constant,
(formally ρ , Mc/L, 0 < ρ < ∞), while K and Mf are finite (Mf ≥ 5), and when a
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PRake with LP coefficients according to the MRC scheme is adopted (with r , LP /L,
0 < r ≤ 1), the terms ζk−1 and γ0,k−1 converge almost surely (a.s.) to
ζ−1k
a.s.→ K − 1
M
· µ (Λ, r) , (3.34)
where
µ (Λ, r) =
(Λ− 1) · Λr−1
Λr − 1 , (3.35)
and
γ−10,k
a.s.→ 1
M
· ν (Λ, r, ρ) , (3.36)
where
ν (Λ, r, ρ) =


Λ (Λρ − 1) (4Λ2r + 3Λρ − 1)− 2Λr+ρ (Λr + 3Λ− 1) ρ log Λ
2 (Λr − 1)2 ρΛ1+ρ log Λ ,
if 0 ≤ ρ ≤ min(r, 1 − r); (3.37a)
Λ (4Λρ − 1) (Λ2r − 1)− 2Λr+ρ (3Λr − ρ+ Λrρ) log Λ
2 (Λr − 1)2 ρΛ1+ρ log Λ ,
if min(r, 1 − r) ≤ ρ ≤ max(r, 1 − r)
and r ≤ 1/2; (3.37b)
−4Λ2+2r − 4Λ2+ρ + Λ2(r+ρ) + 4Λ2+2r+ρ + 3Λ2+2ρ
2 (Λr − 1)2 ρΛ2+ρ log Λ ,
+
−2Λ1+r+ρ (r + 3Λρ+ Λrρ− 1) log Λ
2 (Λr − 1)2 ρΛ2+ρ log Λ ,
if min(r, 1 − r) ≤ ρ ≤ max(r, 1 − r)
and r ≥ 1/2; (3.37c)
−Λ2+2r − 4Λ2+ρ + Λ2(r+ρ) + 4Λ2+2r+ρ
2 (Λr − 1)2 ρΛ2+ρ log Λ ,
+
−2Λ1+r+ρ (r + 3Λr + Λrρ− 1) log Λ
2 (Λr − 1)2 ρΛ2+ρ log Λ ,
if max(r, 1 − r) ≤ ρ ≤ 1; (3.37d)
2Λ
(
Λ2r − 1)− (Λr + r + 3Λr − 1) Λr log Λ
(Λr − 1)2 ρΛ log Λ ,
if ρ ≥ 1. (3.37e)
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The proofs can be found in [49]. It is also possible to obtain results for more specific
scenarios using (3.34) and (3.36) with particular values of Λ and r, as shown below.
b. PRake with flat aPDP
The results presented above can be used to study the case of a channel model assuming
flat aPDP. As already mentioned, the flat aPDP model is captured when Λ = 1. In
order to obtain expressions suitable for this case, it is sufficient to let Λ go to 1 in both
(3.34) and (3.36). The former yields
lim
Λ→1
µ (Λ, r) =
1
r
, (3.38)
whereas the result given by the latter is
lim
Λ→1
ν (Λ, r, ρ) =


2r2 + 2r − 4ρr + ρ2
2r2
,
if 0 ≤ ρ ≤ min(r, 1 − r); (3.39a)
1
2
(
2− ρ
r
+
r
ρ
− 1
)
,
if min(r, 1 − r) ≤ ρ ≤ max(r, 1 − r)
and r ≤ 1/2; (3.39b)
r3 + r2(9ρ− 3) + r(3− 9ρ2) + 4ρ3 − 3ρ2 + 3ρ− 1
6ρr2
,
if min(r, 1 − r) ≤ ρ ≤ max(r, 1 − r)
and r ≥ 1/2; (3.39c)
4r3 − 3r2 + 3r + (ρ− 1)3
6ρr2
,
if max(r, 1 − r) ≤ ρ ≤ 1; (3.39d)
4r2 − 3r + 3
6ρr
,
if ρ ≥ 1. (3.39e)
c. ARake with exponentially decaying aPDP
These results can also describe the model of a wireless network using ARake receivers
at the AP. An ARake receiver is a PRake receiver with r = 1. Letting r go to 1 in
(3.34) and (3.36), it is possible to obtain approximations for the MAI and SI terms in
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Figure 3.3: Average PDP versus normalized excess delay
a multipath channel with exponentially decaying aPDP as follows:
µA (Λ) = lim
r→1
µ (Λ, r) = 1, (3.40)
νA (Λ, ρ) = lim
r→1
ν (Λ, r, ρ) =
=


2
(
Λ2 − 1 + Λρ − Λ2−ρ − 2Λρ log Λ)
(Λ− 1)2 ρ log Λ , if ρ ≤ 1,
2
(
Λ2 − 1− 2Λ log Λ)
(Λ− 1)2 ρ log Λ , if ρ ≥ 1.
(3.41)
It is worth noting that the result for ρ ≤ 1 in (3.41) has been obtained by letting r→ 1
in (3.37c).
d. ARake with flat aPDP
The simplest case is represented by a wireless network using the ARake receivers at the
AP, where the channel is assumed to have a flat aPDP. This situation can be captured
by simultaneously letting both Λ and r go to 1 in (3.34) and (3.36). This approach
gives
lim
Λ→1,
r→1
µ (Λ, r) = 1, (3.42)
lim
Λ→1,
r→1
ν (Λ, r, ρ) =


2
3
(
ρ2 − 3ρ+ 3), if ρ ≤ 1,
2
3ρ
, if ρ ≥ 1.
(3.43)
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As in (3.41), the result for ρ ≤ 1 in (3.43) has been obtained by letting r → 1,Λ → 1
in (3.37c). It is worth noting that (3.42) and (3.43) coincide with the results obtained
in [38] for the specific case of ARake receivers and flat aPDP.
These results confirm that the accurate approximations for the SI and the MAI terms are
independent of large-scale fading models, as claimed in [38], since they do not depend on the
variance of the users. Thus (3.32) can be replaced with
Γ
(
M
ν (Λ, r, ρ)
)
· 1
M
[ν (Λ, r, ρ) + (K − 1) · µ (Λ, r)] < 1. (3.44)
3.2.2 Uniqueness
In Sect. 3.2.1, we have proven that at least a GNE exists for the game G′. In this subsection,
we show that this equilibrium is also unique. To this aim, we consider the GNE from another
point of view, focusing on the transmit power pk. The power level chosen by a rational
self-optimizing player is its best response to the powers p\k chosen by the other players
(any threshold, including receiver k’s λk, does not affect this choice, due to the monotonic
decreasing behaviour of PD with λk). Formally, player k’s best response is the map that
assigns to each p\k ∈ P\k the set
rk
(
p\k
)
=
{
pk ∈ Pk : uk
(
[pk,p\k], λk
) ≥ uk ([p′k,p\k], λk) ∀p′k ∈ Pk} (3.45)
where P\k is the strategy space of all users excluding user k. With the notion of a player’s
best response, the transmit power at the GNE can be restated in a compact form: the power
vector p∗ is the vector of transmit powers at the GNE of the game G′ for all k ∈ K.
Theorem 4 The game G′ has a unique GNE, achieved when
λ∗k = λk(γ
∗
k), (3.46)
p∗k =
ξ−1k
(γ∗k)−1 − γ−10,k
, (3.47)
where γ∗k is defined as in (3.19).
Proof By Theorem 1, we know that there exist equilibria G′. Given a target SINR γ∗k ,
obtained as in (3.19), there exists an optimum threshold
λ∗k = λ(γ
∗
k , γ) = λk(γ
∗
k). (3.48)
50 Theory
In terms of transmit powers, player k’s best response to a given interference vector p\k is
p∗k = rk
(
p\k
)
= γ∗k ·
K∑
i=1,i 6=k
h
(MAI)
ki pi + σ
2
h
(SP)
k − γ∗kh(SI)k
=
ξ−1k
(γ∗k)−1 − γ−10,k
. (3.49)
Hence, although the optimal RA is given by the bidimensional strategy a∗k = (p
∗
k, λ
∗
k), the
optimization problem turns out to be a scalar one. This is because p∗k and λ
∗
k are not
independent, but they are both functions of γ∗k, as is apparent from the relation above (they
must lay on the contour of the strategy set A′k).
Let p∗ denote the power vector at the GNE. By definition, it must satisfy p∗ = r(p∗),
where r(p∗) =
[
r1
(
p∗\1
)
, · · · , rK
(
p∗\K
)]
. The fixed point p∗ = r(p∗) is unique if the
correspondence r(p) is a standard function [50], i.e., if it satisfies the following properties:
a. positivity: r(p) > 0;
b. monotonicity: if p > p′ (i.e., if pk > pk ′ ∀k), then r(p) > r(p′);
c. scalability: for all η > 1, ηr(p) > r(ηp).
Taking into account (3.48), the first condition translates into p∗k > 0 for all k ∈ K. The proof
is straightforward: the term at the numerator of (3.47) is a positive quantity, in fact (3.7)
contains a ratio between positive parameters; at the denominator it is the same, making use
of (2.39) and (3.14). Recalling (3.48) again, the second and the third conditions are also
apparent, since p\k modifies only the numerator of (3.47). Since p∗ is unique, there exists
also a unique λ∗ = [λ∗1, . . . , λ
∗
K ] at the GNE, thanks to bijection of λ(·). 
Chapter 4
Implementation
4.1 Description of the algorithm
An iterative, distributed algorithm to reach the GNE of the proposed game G′ based on a
best-response dynamics is described in this section. Considering the coherent detection as
used in this thesis, in Appendix A some explicit expressions are provided, among their, the
ones referred to γ and λk(γk(n)) as exploited in the proposed algorithm, in particular. The
algorithm runs as follows:
a. Initialization of the game: each user k = 1, . . . ,K
a1) sets γ = γ(P FA) =
1
2N
[
Q−1(P FA)
]2
;
a2) computes the SINR level γ∗k using (3.19)
γ∗k =

 γ, γ(1−
γ
γ0,k
) ≤ f(γ, γ),
γ˜k, γ(1− γγ0,k ) > f(γ, γ);
(4.1)
a3) initializes the transmit power pk(0) selecting a random value within the range
[0, p];
a4) sets the initial iteration step n = 0.
b. Best-response algorithm: at each step n of the algorithm, each user k = 1, . . . ,K
b1) (at the rx side) computes the SINR γk(n) measured at the access point according
to
γk(n) =
h
(SP)
k pk(n)
h
(SI)
k pk(n) +
K∑
i=1,i 6=k
h
(MAI)
ki pi(n) + σ
2
; (4.2)
b2) (at the rx side) updates the threshold according to
λk(n) = λk(γk(n)) =
√
γ
γk(n)
; (4.3)
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b3) (at the tx side) receives the SINR γk(n) computed as in (4.2);
b4) (at the tx side) adjusts the transmit power according to
pk(n+ 1) = pk(n) ·
1
γk(n)
− 1γ0,k
1
γ∗k
− 1γ0,k
; (4.4)
b5) (at the tx side) if pk(n+ 1) > pk, sets pk(n+ 1) = pk;
b6) (at both the tx and the rx sides) updates n = n+ 1.
Some considerations are needed for both the initialization and the best-response algorithm.
To let the algorithm provide the optimal performance in terms of code acqisition, we assume
(3.22) to be verified: in the practice, a node acting as the network controller can check it,
and, if this is not the case, then it can select the optimal subset of K which satisfies (3.22). In
terms of initial transmit power, Step a3 performs the simplest initialization, although smarter
approaches can be used [51]. For istance, user k can set its initial power assuming the network
to be a Single-User (SU) system, provided it is able to estimate the AWGN power:
pkSU (0) =
σ2γ∗k
h
(SP)
k (1− γ∗k/γ0,k)
, (4.5)
where the subscript SU is used to emphasize that the power initialization refers to the SU
assumption. However, as it will be displayed in the next section, pk(0) affects only the
convergence speed of the algorithm, but not its outcome, which is equal to the GNE of the
game. As for the best-response algorithm, let us examine the steps more in detail. Step b2
chooses the threshold that maximizes the probability of false alarm. If λk(n) > 1, the QoS
requirement PFA,k is not met, and thus no decisions on the code alignment are taken by the
k-th receiver. Looking at Step b4, it may appear from (3.47) that each user should know
other users’ parameters (pi(n) and h
(MAI)
ki for i 6= k). On the contrary, it turns out that
user k only needs to know its own received SINR γk(n) (Step b3). In fact, the term due to
interference-plus-noise in (3.47) can be obtained from (4.2) as
h
(SI)
k pk(n) +
K∑
i=1,i 6=k
h
(MAI)
ki pi(n) + σ
2 =
h
(SP)
k pk(n)
γk(n)
. (4.6)
Hence, (3.47) translates into the distributed update (4.4). The only information that is
locally unavailable is γk(n), which can be fed back by the AP with a very modest data rate
requirement on the signaling channel. About the way the rx measures the SINR level when
the code synchronization is not yet achieved, in the results provided in the following section,
we assume a genie-aided framework that allows each tx to know its received SINR at the
concentration point.
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Figure 4.1: Shape of µ (Λ, r) and ζ−1k averaged over K = 5 users versus r
4.2 Simulation results
This section shows some results that confirm the theoretical analysis presented in this thesis.
During the various simulations, we refer to the UWB system characterization described in
Sect. 3.2. We assume σ2k = (d0/dk)
x, where x is the well-known Path Loss Exponent (PLE)
and it is posed equal to 2, d0 is the tx-rx reference distance, and dk is the distance between the
k-th tx and the AP and it is uniformly distributed between dmin and dmax. Their respective
used values vary during the simulations and so they will be specified when necessary. An
other important question to underline is about condition (3.22): in the proposed simulations,
it is always fulfilled, except when otherwise indicated.
Figs. 4.1 and 4.2 make reference to the large system analysis (described in Sect. 3.2): they
show the shapes of the theoretical and of the simulated curves of (3.34) and (3.36), graphically
verifying their validity. It can be seen that these approximations are more accurate with
higher r (r = 1 is an ARake). The solid lines are averaged over the values of K = 5 users of
a multiuser system (with Λ = 10 dB, d0 = dmin = 1m, dmax = 10m, M = 100, L = 10, and
ρ = 0.1).
Fig. 4.3 depicts the shapes of Nγ∗k as a function of γ0,k under different constraints of PFA:
the lower PFA, the stronger the constraint over the QoS, the higher the necessary level of
SINR to enforce it. Note that for higher SI (i.e., lower γ0,k), Nγ
∗
k assumes a constant level
before to rise up: the optimal SINR is an increasing function of γ0,k but, meanwhile γ
∗
k ≤ γ ,
(4.1) establishes that γ∗k = γ and considering that γ is a constant once PFA is fixed, the
54 Implementation
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
 
 
r
1
M
· ν (Λ, r, ρ)
γ−1
0,k
Figure 4.2: Shape of ν (Λ, r, ρ) and γ−1
0,k averaged over K = 5 users versus r
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
 
 
γ0,k [ dB]
N
·γ
∗ k
[d
B
]
PFA = 10
−7
PFA = 10
−5
PFA = 10
−3
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Figure 4.4: Transmit power as a function of the iteration step on a different power initialization
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Figure 4.5: SINR as a function of the iteration step on a different power initialization
behaviour of those curves is justified.
Figs. 4.4 and 4.5 refer to the transmit power initialization of each user k (Step a3 of the
algorithm in Sect. 4.1): a comparison between the two different methods presented is made.
We can observe that both the transmit power and the SINR, after a certain number of steps,
reach the same final values in spite of the different initialization, but it is worth noting that
there is a substantial waste of power with the ramdom one. In Fig. 4.4, the solid lines start
over the dashed-dotted lines (some of them even from about eight orders of magnitude) and
remain on an upper level until about the 80-th step. As a consequence, the SINRs of Fig. 4.5
assume higher values than necessary until the same step. It is clear that all this wasted power
can be avoided with the SU initialization, with a further gain due to a quicker stabilization
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Figure 4.6: Transmit power as a function of the iteration step when condition (3.22) is not enforced
(a few more of ten steps instead of about eighty in that figures). In the remainder, we always
use the SU transmit power initialization for all simulations. To obtain such representation,
we posed d0 = 1m, dmin = 3m, dmax = 100m, K = 5, Mf = Mc = 10, L = 40, LP =
16, Λ = 20 dB, P FA = 10
−6, and σ2 = 5 · 10−16 W. Note also that in the early steps of Fig.
4.4, because of pk limitation under pk = 1mW, in the case where users reach that limit, it
leads to the fluctuating shapes of the respectives γk of Fig. 4.5.
An example of the behaviours of the transmit power and of the SINR as a function of the
iteration step, when condition (3.22) is not enforced, is provided by Fig. 4.6 and Fig. 4.7.
The values used to show this example are the same of the previous simulation, except for
L = 200, LP = 100, and Λ = 1dB. The main observation is that the power levels of four
users out of five rise up until to be limited by p = 1mW, leading to an impossibility of
the respective optimal SINR levels to be reached. While one user, with a lower power level
necessity, reach its γ∗, it is also apparent that in other cases there is a downfall of the SINR
level and a consequent detriment of the whole system.
The figure set from Fig. 4.8 to Fig. 4.17 show the behaviour of some critical parameters
as a function of the iteration step over a certain constraint of PFA. In the first five ones,
PFA = 10
−5, while in the second five ones, PFA = 10−3. In the second group of figures,
the constraint on the QoS is milder than in the first one, hence we can observe that the
parameters become stable in a less number of steps than in the other. We can also note
that they have lower power and SINR levels, higher treshold values and, obviously, higher
PFA’s with lower PD’s in the meanwhile. In both cases, we can see that the terminals
rapidly converge to the desired pairs (p∗k, λ
∗
k). It is worth nothing that at the beginning of
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Figure 4.7: SINR as a function of the iteration step when condition (3.22) is not enforced
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Figure 4.8: Transmit powers of K = 5 users as a function of the iteration step over the constraint
PFA = 10
−5
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Figure 4.9: SINRs of K = 5 users as a function of the iteration step over the constraint PFA = 10
−5
the algorithm, λk > 1 for some users: this means that the QoS constraint is not met. As a
consequence, such terminals cannot apply the synchronization strategy (their detectors are
switched off), and they remain in an initial phase of power control only. However, after a few
steps, λk ≤ 1, which yields PFA ≤ PFA. This can be easily verified in Figs. 4.11 and 4.16:
in these network configurations, after the 3rd and the 2nd step, respectively, all users meet
their QoS requirements, while maximizing their probability of correct detection PD (Figs.
4.12 and 4.17). All the values used to create this set of figures are the same specified above
in the different power initialization simulations.
To evaluate the benefits of the proposed approach, Fig. 4.18 shows the average transmit
power
∑nacq
n=0 p(n), normalized to the AWGN power σ
2, consumed by each terminal to achieve
the correct code alignment, with nacq denoting the experimental number of steps required by
the best-response algorithm presented in Sect. 3.2. Throughout the simulations, obtained
averaging 100,000 independent network realizations with condition (3.22) fulfilled, we assume
d0 = 10m, dmin = 3m, dmax = 100m, L = 20, LP = 16,Λ = 10dB, pk = 50µW, σ
2 =
50nW, N = 10, and M = 128. Circles, squares, and stars represent the cases Mc = {1, 8, 32},
respectively, whereas blue, red, and cyan lines represent the cases PFA = {10−3, 10−5, 10−7},
respectively, with γ∗k computed as in the proposed criterion (i.e., equation (4.1)), finally, the
black lines refer to γ∗k provided by the detection-oriented criterion, with 100 bits of information
per data packet (which does not depend on PFA, and is in general higher than that given by
(4.1) for N > 1 and PFA > 10
−10 [52]). In that detection-oriented criterion, the K-th user
utility function is the ratio of its throughput to its transmit power (for further details refer
to [38]). As commented above, strongest QoS constraints lead to higher level of power as
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Figure 4.11: Probabilities of false alarm of K = 5 users as a function of the iteration step over the
constraint PFA = 10
−5
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Figure 4.13: Transmit powers of K = 5 users as a function of the iteration step over the constraint
PFA = 10
−3
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Figure 4.14: SINRs of K = 5 users as a function of the iteration step over the constraint PFA = 10
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Figure 4.15: Thresholds of K = 5 users as a function of the iteration step over the constraint
PFA = 10
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Figure 4.16: Probabilities of false alarm of K = 5 users as a function of the iteration step over the
constraint PFA = 10
−3
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Figure 4.17: Probabilities of detection of K = 5 users as a function of the iteration step over the
constraint PFA = 10
−3
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Figure 4.18: Average normalized transmit power per acquisition as a function of the number of users
demonstrated by the blue, red and cyan lines, whereas, increasing values of Mc imply a lower
level of power thanks to a greater robustness against the multipath channel (look at circles,
squares and stars). Enlarging the figure, the lines of the same color, indistinguishable with
that resolution, have different power levels depending on Mc.
As can be seen, the proposed approach provides the best performance, expecially when
placing milder requirements in terms of PFA.

Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this thesis, we used a game-theoretic approach to study distributed power control tech-
niques in the uplink of wideband wireless communication networks. In particular, we focused
our research on the optimization of initial code synchronization of the physical-layer multiple
access UWB technology over a frequency-selective and slow-fading channel. Thanks to the
sufficiently generality of the proposed framework, the scope of this thesis is not limited to
UWB-based systems, but also to CDMA networks as a subcase.
In our formulated noncooperative game, we looked for a utility function that maximizes
the life of a battery-operated terminal, while optimizing the initial code synchronization: the
ratio between the probability of signal detection versus the transmitted energy per acquisition
period. As a consequence, every transmitter-receiver pair of the multiuser system chooses
its transmit power and detection threshold, respectively. This is the desired result deriving
from the best-response algorithm proposed in this thesis. When each user adopts a best-
response strategy, consisting of updating its transmit power according to the SINR measured
at the AP, all users achieve a unique stable equilibrium from which no terminal wishes to
unilaterally deviate (the GNE).
To demonstrate some parts of our theorems, we used also the tools of the large system
analysis. In particular they helped us to verify that some parameters were independent of
interferences such as SI and MAI, irrespective of the various combinations between Partial- or
All-Rake receivers with MRC, and flat or exponentially decaying aPDP in multipath channels,
hence, irrespective of the statistics of the channel taps (assuming a tapped-delay line model).
The set of implemented simulations confirmed us the validity of the large system analysis
results exploitation and, furthermore, the validity of our proposed algorithm as an efficient
one able to save power while quickly synchronize UWB/CDMA codes.

Appendix A
Coherent detection
This section contains the description of coherent synchronization strategy and, in addition to
explicit expressions for the probabilities of false alarm and correct detection, the verification
of the four properties formulated in Sect. 2.3.
When the phase offset θk,l is known at the rx side, the optimal synchronization strategy wk,
in the sense of maximum likelihood estimation, is wk ∼ N (µk, 1/(2Nγk)), where µk = δ∆˜k∆k
(refer to Sect. 2.3 again, for a detailed description). In the case µk = 0, the probability of
false alarm can be computed as
PFA(γk, λk) = Q
(
λk
√
2Nγk
)
, (A.1)
where Q(x) = 1√
2π
∫ +∞
x exp(−t2/2)dt is the complementary cumulative distribution function
(cdf) of a standard random variable. Similarly, in the case µk = 1,
PD(γk, λk) = 1−Q
(
(1− λk)
√
2Nγk
)
. (A.2)
Properties P1-P3 can easily verified using the properties of Q(.). Let us then focus on P4
by investigating the concavity of PD with respect to λk. The first derivative is
d
dλk
PD(γk, λk) = −
√
Nγk
π
e−(1−λk)
2Nγk < 0, (A.3)
confirming P1. Using (A.3), the second derivative is
d2
dλk
2PD(γk, λk) = −2Nγk(1− λk)
√
Nγk
π
e−(1−λk)
2Nγk ≤ 0, (A.4)
since 0 ≤ λk ≤ 1 and γk ≥ 0. Studying on the behaviour of PD with respect to γk,
d
dγk
PD(γk, λk) = P
′
D(γk, γ) =
1− λk
2
√
πγk
N
e−(1−λk)
2Nγk ≥ 0, (A.5)
for 0 ≤ λk ≤ 1, thus confirming P3. Differentiating with respect to γk again,
d2
dγk2
PD(γk, λk) = P
′′
D(γk, γ) = −
1− λk
4γk
√
πγk
N
e−(1−λk)
2Nγk [2Nγk(1− λk)2 + 1] ≤ 0, (A.6)
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which confirms the validity of P4 in the case of coherent synchronization.
Let us now specify the functions γ and λk(γk) defined in (3.12) and (3.13), respectively:
γ = γ(PFA) =
1
2N
[
Q−1(PFA)
]2
, (A.7)
λk(γk) = λ(γk, γ) =
√
γ
γk
, (A.8)
where Q−1(·) is the inverse function. Hence,
PD(γk, λk = λk(γk)) = 1−Q
(√
2Nγk −
√
2Nγ
)
. (A.9)
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